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INTRODUCTION

The United States Arbitration Act became law in 19251 with virtually no
opposition, 2 but over the years ambiguities in the legislation have provoked
thorny questions of federal-state relations.3 The Act declares arbitration agreements within its purview to be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," ' 4 and

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A., Mary Baldwin
College, 1969; J.D., University of Arizona, 1976. I thank Christine Holland, Graduating Class of
1985, University of Houston Law Center, for her skillful research assistance in the preparation of
this article.
I. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 215, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. S § 1-14 (1982)).
2. There was no overt opposition in Congress, see infra notes 95 & 97 and accompanying
text, but controversy over the Act did surface within the American Bar Association. See infra note
96 and accompanying text.
3. Substantial commentary has focused on questions of choice of law and the application of
the Erie doctrine under the Act, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Bernhardt
v, Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). See, e.g., Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters
Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580 (1952);
Note, Federal Arbitration Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DuKE
LJ. 588; Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism,
58 Nw. U.L. REv. 468 (1963); Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. REv.
607 (1967); Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights,
Remedies and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960).
4. 9 U.S.C. S 2 (1982).
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provides procedures for enforcement of such agreements in federal court.5 Congress enacted the statute to abrogate the outdated and little understood common
law prohibition against specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. The primary authority for the Act in the drafters' view was congressional power over
federal court procedure. 6 In light of the statute's "procedural" origins, courts
until very recently did not agree on the fundamental issues of whether the Act
applied in state court and whether the Act preempted contrary state substantive
law.7
In Southland Corp. v. Keating the United States Supreme Court held that the
Act was binding on the state courts and that the Act preempted a provision
of the California Franchise Investment Law guaranteeing a judicial forum for
franchisees' claims.' Under Keating, the states lack power to ensure that specially
favored claims, such as claims brought under investor-protection or consumerprotection statutes, will be resolved by a court rather than by an arbitration
panel. 9
The preemption holding in Keating was unnecessarily heavy-handed in light
of Congress's limited objective in 1925. Indeed, because of respect for state
sovereignty and autonomy apparent among members of the Sixty-Eighth Congress,"0 the legislators probably would not have enacted the statute had they
foreseen the Keating decision. Moreover, apart from the specific preemption
holding in Keating, the Court's questionable view of congressional intent has
relevance for a variety of choice-of-law issues now facing state and federal courts.
It remains uncertain to what extent, if any, state law governs questions arising
under the Act regarding the existence and enforceability of arbitration agree-

5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4, 9-11 (1982).
6. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see infra notes 79-100
and accompanying text.
7. The high courts of several states concluded that the federal Arbitration Act did not apply
to litigation brought in state court. See, e.g., Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334
(Del. 1973); Thayer v. American Fin. Advisors, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. 1982). Other courts
held that the Act, although applicable in state court, did not preempt contrary state substantive
policies. See, e.g., Alabama Oxygen Co. v. York Int'l, 433 So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Ala. 1983) (federal
Act did not preempt state policy against enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes),
vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 12527, 597 P.2d 290, 310-12, (federal Arbitration Act did not preempt state antitrust laws so as to
require submission of state antitrust claims to arbitration), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 911 (1979). In
contrast, many courts held that the federal Act applied in state court and preempted any state law
or policy to the contrary. See, e.g., R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7
Kan. App. 2d 363, 368, 642 P.2d 127, 129 (1982); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Corp.,
239 S.E.2d 647, 649 (S.C. 1977); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 199, 203-04, 597
P.2d 380, 381-82 (1979).
8. 104 S. Ct. 852, 861 (1984).
9. For example, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act includes a non-waivability provision
to ensure rights under the Act cannot be nullified by agreement. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1984). In Commerce Park v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334,
339 (5th Cir. 1984), decided after Keating, the court concluded that the federal Arbitration Act
preempts S 17.42. Thus, the federal Act abrogates the right guaranteed by Texas law to have a
court resolve alleged violations of the deceptive trade practices law.
10. See infra notes 119-20, 179-83 and accompanying text.
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ments. Some courts prior to Keating viewed state contract law as governing
except where inconsistent with the Act." Others held that all issues concerning
the existence, validity, and enforceability of arbitration agreements within the
purview of the Act were necessarily federal in nature and governed by federal
common law.' 2 Although the Court in Keating did not address the choice of
law matter directly, the decision has implications for its resolution.
Keating similarly left unresolved whether the Act applies in its entirety to
state courts or, conversely, whether state courts are free to follow their own
procedures while adhering to the substantive command of the Act. In addition,
in actions brought under the Act in state or federal court, confusion exists over
3
the extent to which state law governs on questions unrelated to arbitration.
Important issues of institutional relations between federal and state courts
likewise remain unsettled after Keating. The lower courts disagree over whether
the Act assigns exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts for particular proceedings.' 4 Moreover, the concurrent prosecution of federal and state court proceedings between the same parties on the same controversy might increase now
that Keating has made clear the applicability of the Arbitration Act to state
courts. Hence, the extent to which one court system may interfere with the
other in finally determining an arbitration dispute merits consideration.
This article develops an approach to these questions based primarily on the
congressional purpose behind the Arbitration Act. The central theme is that
the narrow congressional goal in 1925 was to abrogate the common law rule
of nonenforceability of arbitration agreements. Congress, believing the Act would
have its primary impact on the federal judiciary, never addressed the Act's
applicablity to states and clearly did not envision a sweeping application in
state courts.' 5 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's emphasis in Keating16 and
other cases' 7 on a strong federal policy favoring commercial arbitration, the Act

11. See Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979);
Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22 (5th
Cir. 1980); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972); Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
13. The Second Circuit, for example, has held that New York's door closing statute, while
generally applicable in diversity of citizenship cases in federal court, does not apply to diversity
actions under the federal Arbitration Act. See Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum
Co., 550 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (2d Cir. 1977). The case is discussed at infra note 204.
14. Compare e.g., General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 970-71 (9th
Cir. 1981) (suggesting federal courts might have exclusive jurisdiction to confirm arbitration awards
under the Act), cert. dnied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 251 Ga. 701, 702-03, 308 S.E.2d 830, 831-32 (1983) (suggesting federal courts might
have exclusive jurisdiction to vacate arbitration awards under the Act) with Paul Allison, Inc. v.
Miniken Storage, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 573, 574-75 (D. Neb. 1978) (federal Act did not supersede
availability of common law remedies to enforce arbitration awards); McEntire v. Monarch Feed
Mills, Inc., 276 Ark. 1, 631 S.W.2d 307 (1982) (no provision in the federal Act constitutes a grant
of exclusive jurisdiction).
15. &e infta notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
16. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 858 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242-43 (1985) (strong
federal policy underlying Act requires enforcement of arbitration agreements, even if result is piecemeal litigation); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ....
).
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itself does not create a status of "super-enforceability" for arbitration agreements. The Act on its face makes arbitration agreements enforceable as any
other contract. 8 Congress overrode the common law hostility to enforcement
of arbitration agreements and substituted a statutory mandate for judicial neutrality.
According to traditional limitations on federal preemption, courts should give
to federal law a preemptive effect no broader than necessary to accomplish the
underlying congressional objective.19 Courts, then, should respect state substantive policies that do not unavoidably conflict with the purpose of the Arbitration
Act. State courts should be allowed to follow their own procedures with regard
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements if those procedures are consistent
with the substantive command of the federal Act. Moreover, courts should not
read the broad holding of Keating to mean that state law must give way any
time it would operate to the disadvantage of a party seeking arbitration. State
law unrelated to arbitration should continue to govern unless displaced by a
specific provision of federal law.
Congressional goals underlying the Act should likewise provide the framework for analysis of institutional relations between state and federal courts.
Neither the language of the Act nor its legislative history suggests Congress
intended to exclude state court authority over any category of proceedings to
enforce arbitration agreements. 20 On the other hand, an inference that the federal
judiciary has a special power to coerce state court compliance with the Act is
unfounded. Where concurrent state and federal court lawsuits under the Act
are pending, each court must decide whether to proceed with duplicative litigation. In light of Keating, federal courts must presume state courts competent
to determine questions arising under the Act and should not interfere with state
court proceedings except on a showing of extraordinary need.
Part II of this article presents an overview of the Act and of state legislation
on the subject of commercial arbitration. Part III outlines the history of the Act
and gives a critique of Supreme Court case law that has misrepresented that
history. The preemption holding of Keating and the related topics of choice of
substantive and procedural law under the Act constitute the focus of Part IV.
Part V addresses questions of judicial jurisdiction under the Act and other
problems of institutional relations between state and federal courts.
II.

OVERVIEW
AND

OF THE UNITED

STATES

STATE ARBITRATION

A.

ARBITRATION

ACT

LEGISLATION

Structure of the Federal Act

The federal Arbitration Act establishes a general rule of enforceability of
written arbitration agreements in maritime transactions and in contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce." The Act sets up specific procedures,

18.

See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), quoted at infra note 27.

19.
20.
21.

See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
9 U.S.C. §§1-2 (1982).
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facially applicable only in federal courts, for judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreements.2 2 Section 1, in describing the scope of the Act, defines "maritime
transactions" broadly, 23 and courts have given the "involving commerce" terminology a similarly broad interpretation. The statute, as construed, applies to
contracts having only a minimal connection to commerce, and, for example,
has been held applicable to an installation contract where the object to be
installed had been shipped in interstate commerce. 24 Although section 1 expressly
excludes only employee contracts from the coverage of the Act, 25 courts have
26
created other exceptions under separate federal statutes.
Section 2 declares that written arbitration agreements within the purview of
the Act, with respect to both existing and future disputes, "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." ' 27 The command of section 2, coupled
22.

9 U.S.C. 55 3-4, 9-11 (1982).

23.

9 U.S.C. 5 1 (1982) provides:
"Maritime transactions" and "Commerce" defined; exceptions to operation of title
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of
water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to
vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controvdrsy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein defined,
means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory
of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn.
1979); Blanks v. Midstate Constr., 610 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). But see Bryant-Durham
Elec. Co. v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 42 N.C. App. 352, 356, 256 S.E.2d 529, 532 (1979)
(shipment of materials in interstate commerce not sufficient to bring arbitration clause in construction
contract within purview of federal Act).
25. The exclusion of employment contracts was apparently the suggestion of Herbert Hoover,
then Secretary of Commerce, in commenting on an earlier version of the law proposed in the
Sixty-Seventh Congress. See Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on theJudiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 14 (1923) (letter from Herbert Hoover) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 4214]. Testimony at the hearing makes it clear that the bill was not intended to
cover labor arbitration. See aid at 9-10. The letter from Hoover was similarly made a part of the
record during joint hearings held in 1924. See Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
Subcomm. of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearings]. Under 5 301(a) of the Labor,Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), the
federal courts have jurisdictions to compel arbitration of labor disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements. See generally United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960).
26. See infia notes 41-64 and accompanying text.
27. 9 U.S.C. 5 2 (1982) provides:
Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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with the saving clause, ensures that arbitration agreements are enforceable just
28
as other contracts, and subject to the same defenses.
The Act creates two routes toward judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements: a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration; 29 and an independent
action for an order compelling arbitration. 30 With respect to each option, the
statute on its face contemplates a proceeding in federal court and, at the same
time, requires an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 3 authorizes a stay of proceedings pending arbitration when a suit "in
any of the courts of the United States" involves an issue referable to arbitration. 1 Section 4 authorizes "any United States district court," when petitioned by an aggrieved party, to issue an order compelling arbitration of a
controversy otherwise within the court's jurisdiction.32 If the making of the
arbitration agreement or a failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue,

28. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1924) ("An arbitration agreement is
placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.").

29.
30.

9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
9 U.S.C. S 4 (1982).

31.

9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the
court in which suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id. The reference to "courts of the United States" should be read to mean federal courts. Although
the Supreme Court in dictum has suggested the words are ambiguous and may include state courts,
see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 n 34 (1983),
Congress in the federal Judicial Code repeatedly has used the phrase to indicate the federal courts.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1652, 2041, 2201, 2283 (1982). Moreover, the structure of the Act shows
both § 3 and 5 4 were intended to apply only to the federal courts. Section 4 originally tracked
the language of § 3 and referred to "any court of the United States." See 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
In 1954 Congress substituted "United States district court" to designate the proper federal court,
Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, 19, 68 Stat. 1233, but no substantive change was intended. See
H.R. REP. No. 1981, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1954); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct.
852, 868 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 811, 812 n.2 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of pet. for cert.) (suggesting that § 3 applies to state courts).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28 in a civil action
or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in such agreement ....
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement ....
If the making of the arbitration agreement
or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.
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the court must order the parties to proceed to arbitration.3 3 On the other hand,
if validity of the agreement or compliance with the agreement is in controversy,
34
the court rather than the arbitrator must decide such question.
Sections 9, 10, and 11 concern judicial involvement in the post-arbitration
stage and likewise contemplate proceedings in federal court. Section 9 authorizes
judicial confirmation of any arbitration award where parties have agre'ed that
a court judgment will be entered on the award.35 Parties seeking all order
confirming the award may apply to any court they have specified or, if they
specified no court, to federal district court in the district where the award was
rendered. 36 Sections 10 and 11 provide grounds for a federal court order vacating
or modifying an arbitration award. Reasons for vacating the award include
findings of fundamental flaws in the proceedings such as fraud in award procurement or partiality or misconduct by the arbitrators.3 7 Significantly, under
section 10 an error of law is not a basis for overturning an arbitration award.
Similarly, section 11 authorizes arbitration award modifications for material
factual mistakes, imperfections in form, or extension of the award to matters
not submitted for arbitration, but not for errors of law.3" While parties have

33. 9 U.S.C. S 4 (1982).
34. 9 U.S.C. S 4 (1982). In succeeding provisions the Act establishes guidelines for the
arbitration itself, including the appointment of arbitrators, see 9 U.S.C. S 5 (1982), and the compulsory attendance of witnesses at the arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. S 7 (1982).
35. 9 U.S.C. S 9 (1982) provides in relevant part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court,
then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration
may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected
as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this tide. If no court is specified in the agreement
of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for
the district within which such award was made.
Id.
36.
37.

9 U.S.C. S 9 (1982).
9 U.S.C. S 10 (1982) provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means. (b)
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them. (c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced. (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made. (e) Where an award is vacated and
the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not
expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
38.

9 U.S.C. S 11 (1982) provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
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one year to apply for judicial confirmatioin of an award, 39 the Act provides that
an order to vacate or modify an award must be served within three months
40
after the award is filed or delivered.
B.

Exceptions to the Federal Act

Although Congress did riot specify exceptions to the Act's general rule of
enforceability of arbitration agreements, courts have recognized implied exceptions to the Act as a means of resolving a potential conflict in federal policies.
In Wilko v. Swan, 4 1 for example, the Supreme Court held that the strong policy
underlying the Securities Act of 193342 favoring a judicial forum for securities
claims superseded the arbitration-enforcement policy of the federal Arbitration
43
which declares void
Act. The Court interpreted section 14 of the 1933 Act,
any agreement purporting to waive compliance with the terms of the Act, to
invalidate an arbitration agreement that would have deprived the aggrieved
4 4
While
investor of the right to a judicial resolution of his statutory claims.
lower courts have generally assumed that the Wilko exception to arbitrability
applies to claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,45 the Supreme
Court has not yet decided the question, 46 and at least one justice has expressed
doubt that the Wilko exception should be carried over to claims under the 1934
Act. 47 Other federal statutes under which lower courts have recognized excep4 9
and the
tions to arbitrability include the Sherman Act, 45 the patent laws,
5
1
Act.
Bankruptcy Reform
application of any party to the arbitration(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to
in the award. (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted

to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the
matter submitted. (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote
justice between the parties.
39. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).

41.
42.

346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).

43. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982), provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void."
44. 346 U.S. at 438. The Court reasoned in part that since the protective provisions of the
Securities Act require the exercise of judicial direction to assure their effectiveness, Congress must
have intended § 14 to prohibit agreements waiving the right to judicial trial. Id. at 437.
45. See,e.g., DeLancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1981);
Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978).
46. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1240 n.1 (1985).
47. Id. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28

(1968).
49.

See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Develop. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.

1970).

50.

Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 56 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denzed,

104 S. Ct. 699 (1984).
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The recognition of implicit exceptions to arbitrability implicates unique concerns in the international context. On two occasions the Supreme Court has
concluded that an agreement to arbitrate in the context of an international
commercial transaction was enforceable although the controversy might have
been deemed nonarbitrable in a wholly domestic context. In Scherk v. Alberto
Culver Co. 5 1 the Court held that, in the context of international sales contracts,
the Wilko exception did not extend to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Even assuming that the claim would be nonarbitrable if it arose from a domestic
transaction, the court refused to apply the Wilko analysis. The Court reasoned
that a parochial refusal to enforce an international arbitration agreement would
frustrate "achievement of the orderlines and predicability essential to any international business transaction" and would "damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade. ' 52 Similarly, in its recent decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.53 the Court held that claims arising under
the Sherman Act and encompassed within a valid arbitration clause in an
international commercial transaction were arbitrable. As in Scherk, the Court
did not reach the issue of the arbitrability of the plaintiff's claims in a domestic
transaction,5 4 but focused instead on considerations of international comity, respect for foreign tribunals, and the need for predictability in international commercial transactions.5 5 In both Scherk and Mitsubishi Motors, the Court took into
account the federal policy favoring international arbitration inherent in the United
State's accession to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign Arbitral Awards.56
The nonarbitrability of particular federal claims under the Arbitration Act
has given rise to procedural questions when nonarbitrable claims are joined
with arbitrable claims in the same litigation. For example, if a plaintiff asserts
a nonarbitrable federal securities law claim along with a pendent state law claim,
the court must decide whether to stay arbitration of the state law claim pending
judicial resolution of the nonarbitrable federal claim, or to allow arbitration to
proceed simultaneously with the judicial trial. The Supreme Court recently
addressed the question in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.5 7 At issue was a
federal district court's refusal to compel arbitration of state law claims which
had been asserted in conjunction with federal securities law claims, assumed
by both parties to be nonarbitrable.5 8 The Supreme Court considered two pos-

51.
52.

417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Id. at 516-17.
53. 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985).

54. Id. at 3355. The majority, however, did express "some skepticism" of the doctrine that
antitrust claims are nonarbitrable, id. at 3357, and rejected arguments that arbitration panels are
inherently incapable of fairly determining antitrust claims. Id. at 3357-3358.

55.
56.

Id. at 3355-57.
Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, codified at 9 U.S.C. §S 201-08. The

Court in Mitsubishi Motors stated that, in light of the accession to the Convention, the federal policy

favoring arbitral dispute resolution applies with special force in the field of international commerce,
105 S.Ct. at 3357, and suggested that implied subject-matter exceptions to arbitrability under the
Convention should never be recognized. Id. at 3360-61 n.21. See also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520, n.15.
57. 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985).
58. Id. at 1239-40.
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sible justifications for the district court's action. First, arbitration of the state
claims and simultaneous litigation of the federal securities claims would result
in bifurcated proceedings, thereby thwarting the Arbitration Act's goal of speedy
decisionmaking.5 9 Second, an arbitration award on the state claims might have
a collateral estoppel effect in the securities litigation and thereby undermine the
plaintiff's right to a full judicial trial of his securities claims. 6°
The Court rejected both lines of reasoning. Since the primary purpose of
the Arbitration Act, according to the Court, was "to enforce agreements into
which parties had entered," the Court determined that rigorous enforcement
must take place even if one consequence would be piecemeal litigation. 6 Likewise, the Court disagreed with the lower court's rationale of avoiding the
potential preclusive effect of an arbitration award. Noting that arbitration proceedings will not necessarily have collateral estoppel effect in later federal court
proceedings, 62 the Court emphasized that federal courts have the power to delimit the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings to protect particular
federal interests.6 3 Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in
64
refusing to compel arbitration of the state law claims.
As the cases indicate, the subject of implied exceptions to arbitrability for
particular federal statutory claims involves a weighing of competing federal interests. The question of implied exceptions for state law claims, on the other
hand, implicates the doctrine of preemption. The preemption holding in Keating,
as will be seen, virtually eliminated all arguments for inferring an exception
6
to the Arbitration Act in order to protect particular state interests. 1
C.

State Arbitration Legislation

The preemptive significance of the federal Act in light of Keating depends
in part on the nature of state law on enforcement of arbitration agreements.

59. Id. at 1241.
60. Id. at 1243.
61. Id. 1242-43.
62. The Court largely relied on McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799
(1984), in declaring the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings on the litigation of nonarbitrable claims uncertain. 105 S. Ct. at 1243. In McDonald, the Court held that federal courts
should not accord res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an unappealed arbitration award in
a later civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, both because the full faith and credit mandate
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not apply to arbitration awards, 104 S. Ct. at 1802, and because according
preclusive effect would undermine the efficacy of § 1983 in protecting important federal rights, 104
S. Ct. at 803. The Byrd Court's reliance on McDonald suggests that McDonald's rule of nonpreclusion
applies beyond the context of civil rights actions. But cf Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing McDonald and Byrd and holding collateral
estoppel effect of arbitration award barred later RICO claim).
63. 105 S. Ct. at 1232-44.
64. Id. at 1244. In so holding, the Court rejected the doctrine of "intertwining." Under that
doctrine several courts had held that when a litigant asserts arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims
that arise out of the same transaction and are intertwined factually and legally, a court may deny
arbitration as to the arbitrable claims and try all claims together in the judicial forum. See, e.g.,
Belke v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026 (11th Cir. 1982); Miley v
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. See infra Part IV.
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If a state-enacted statute tracks the federal language, the preemptive effect of
the federal Act will be of little, concern. Where a state, on the other hand, has
diverged from the federal model, the degree to which the federal Act displaces
state authority becomes important.
Today state legislation authoiizing enforcement of arbitration agreements is
almost universal. 66 The arbitration legislation in many states is a variation of
the Uniform Arbitration Act. This Act authorizes specific enforcement of arbitration agreements with respect to both existing and future disputes, 67 allows
judicial review of arbitration awards for errors affecting the arbitration process
but not for errors of law,68 and provides for a 90-day period of limitations for
petitions to vacate or modify. 69 Hence, in states that have adopted the Uniform

Act without substantive change,70 the federal Act and the state statute will
complement one another and the preemptive impact of the federal Act will be
minimal.

66.

Every state except Vermont has enacted some form of commercial arbitration legislation.
ALASKA STAT. 5 09.43.010-.180 (1983); ARIZ. REV. 'STAT.
ANN. S5 12-1501 to -1518 (1982 & Supp. 1983-84); Amuc. STAT. ANN. SS 34-501 to -532 (1962 &
Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 5 1280-1294.2 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. SS 13.22-201
to -223 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 52-408 to -424 (West 1960 & Supp. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, 55 5701-5725 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. §5 16-4301 to -4319 (1981); FLA. STAT.
55 682.01-.22 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE 5S 7-101 to -224 (Supp. 1984); HAWAii REV. STAT.
55658-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE 55 7-901 to -922 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, 5 101-118
(Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp. 1984-85); IND. CODE 5 34-4-2-1 to -22 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1984);
IOWA CODE ANN. SS 679A.1-.19 (West Supp. 1984-85);, KAN. STAT. ANN. S5 5-401 to -422 (1982);
Ky. REV. STAT. 5 417.045-.240 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 9:4201 to :4217 (West
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, SS 5927-5949 (1980); MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN.
5§ 3-201 to -234 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, S§ 1-19 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. 5 572.08-.30 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. 55 11-15-1 to -37 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. 55 435.350-.470 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MoNT. CODE ANN. §5 27-5-101 to -304
(1983); NEB. REv. STAT. 5 25-2103 to -2120 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. 5S 38.015-.205 (1983); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1 to :10 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §5 2A:24-1 to -11 (West 1976); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §S 44-7-1 to -22 (1978); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law SS 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. 55 1-567.1 to .20 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §5 32-29-01 to -21 (1976 & Supp. 1983);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. S5 2711.01-.16 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §S 801-818 (West
Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. 55 33.210-.340 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, s 73017320 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 10-3-1 to -20 (1970 & Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
55 15-48-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. SS 21-25A-1 to -38
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. S 29-5-301 to -320 (Supp. 1984); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
SS 224 to 238-20 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. SS 78-31-1 to -22 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S5 521-554 (1978); VA. CODE S5 8.01-577 to -581 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §S 7.04.010 to .220 (1961 & Supp. 1984-85); W. VA. CODE §5 55-10-1 to -8 (1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 9S 788.01-.18 (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. 55 1-36-101 to -119 (1977).
67. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcTr 51, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1981).
68. UNIF. ARBrrRAToN AcT 5 12(a), 13(a), 7 U.L.A. at 55, 68-69 (1981).
69. UNIF. ARBITRATION AT SS 12(b), 13(a), 7 U.L.A. at 55, 68 (1981).
70. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 572.08-.30 (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. S§ 447-1 to -22 (1978).
Although the Uniform Act expressly applies to employment contracts, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT
551, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1981), many states have excluded such contracts from their commercial arbitration
legislation. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 7-901 (1979); MD. Cs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 5 3-206(b)
(1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 1-567.2(b)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 802(A) (West Supp.
1983-84); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.- 1984).

See ALA. CODE SS 6-6-1 to -16 (1977);
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Some states, in contrast, have diverged markedly from the Uniform Act and
the federal Act. For example, several state statutes authorize specific enforcement
of arbitration agreements only with respect to existing controversies and expressly exclude agreements to arbitrate future disputes. 7 Some statutes, moreover, exclude tort claims from the operation of general commercial arbitration
law, 72 and other categorical exceptions are common. 7 3 A few states have not
74
accorded arbitration awards the same finality given them under the federal Act.
In addition, time limitations for seeking judicial review of arbitration awards
76
75
vary under state law from a limitation of ten days to a period of one year.
Finally, judicial interpretations of state statutes that facially parallel the federal
Act might produce divergent results. Some state courts have carved out exceptions to the state arbitration statute as a matter of judicial construction that
now, as a result of the Court's analysis in Keating, would not constitute exceptions under the federal Act.7 7 Similarly, state courts may construe the state
act to allow greater judicial involvement at the pre-arbitration stage than allowed
78
under the federal Act.

71. See,e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-6-1 (1977); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15-1 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-5-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2103 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-29-01(1) (Supp.
1983); W. VA. CODE 5 55-10-1 (1981).
72. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(a) (West Supp.
1984-85) (exemption applies only to agreements to arbitrate future controversies); KAN STAT. ANN.
§ 5-401 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 224(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
73. For example, claims concerning insurance contracts are excluded from the general rule
of arbitration enforcement in the following states: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1983); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 417.050 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (Vernon Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 802(A) (West Supp. 1983-84); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25A-3 (1979). Questions of title to real estate are generally
excluded from arbitration enforcement in the following states: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5005
(West Supp. 1984-85); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 27-5-101 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 32-29-01 (Supp.
1983); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Page 1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 33.210 (1983).
Furthermore, Iowa and Kansas treat arbitration agreements as to future controversies differently
from existing controversies. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2) (West Supp. 1984-85) (agreements
for future controversies cannot apply to contracts of adhesion, employment contracts, or tort claims);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1982) (agreements for future controversies cannot apply to insurance
contracts, employment contracts, or tort claims).
74. See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-111 (Supp. 1984) ("may be set aside for ... a palpable mistake
of law"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2115 (1979) ("may be rejected ...
for any legal and sufficient
reason"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7302(d)(2) (Purdon 1982) (shall be modified or corrected
if "contrary to law").
75. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-15 (1977).
76. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 542:8 (1974).
77. In New York, the courts have created categorical exceptions to arbitration on the ground
of public policy. See Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc. v. Board of Educ. Union Free School
Dist. No. 3, Town of Huntington, 33 N.Y.2d 229, 351 N.Y.S.2d 670, 306 N.E.2d 791 (1973).
These categories include antitrust claims, Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prod., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d
621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 237 N.E.2d 223 (1968); and matters involving the liquidation of insolvent
insurance companies, Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 4 N.Y.2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602, 149
N.E.2d 885 (1958).
78. The New York courts, for example, at one time did not adhere to the rule of separability,
recognized in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Under the
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After Keating, the diverse state approaches to arbitration enforcement raise
significant preemption questions. In a state court proceeding involving an arbitration agreement governed by the federal Act, the extent to which the state
court must adhere to specific provisions of the federal Act remains unsettled.
A proper resolution of these questions requires an understanding of the Act's
purpose and history.
III.

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY AND SUPREME COURT OBFUSCATION

A.

Congressional Objectives

The United States Arbitration Act was a congressional response to the business community's growing frustration with delays and expense of litigation.7 9

The drafters of the Act viewed arbitration as a decidedly superior means of
commercial dispute resolution. 80 Shortly after the passage of the Act commentators were rhapsodic in their praise of arbitration: they viewed arbitration as
inexpensive, speedy, flexible, amicable, and preventive. 81 Moreover, advocates
believed arbitrators, unlike judges, would bring specialized expertise to the con82
troversy.
Through the federal Act the Sixty-Eighth Congress hoped to remove common
law impediments to specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. 3 Although
common law courts generally recognized the validity of arbitration agreements
and awarded damages for their breach,8 an anachronistic doctrine held that

early New York approach, an allegation of fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an
arbitration clause was to be decided by the court rather than the arbitrators. See Wrap-Vertiser
Corp. v. Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639, 143 N.E.2d 366 (1957). This rule of "nonseparability," which viewed an arbitration clause as part of the container contract and therefore
unenforceable if the entire contract was fraudently induced, gave the courts a more active role at
the outset of an arbitration dispute. The New York Court of Appeals reconsidered and adopted
the federal approach in Weinrott v. Carp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-54, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 192-94,
298 N.E.2d 42, 44-48 (1973).
79. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924); Committee on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 15556 (1925). The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in perishables
and from commercial groups in the major trading centers. Report of the Standing Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, 50 A.B.A. REP. 353, 357 (1925). See also Hearings on S. 4214, supra note
25, at 3.
80. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1924).
81. See, e.g., Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal
Courts (Part 1), 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 238, 249-50 (1930); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration
Law, 12 VA. L. Rav. 265, 271-74 (1926).
82. According to Cohen and Dayton, the expertise of the arbitrators was peculiarly suited
to determinations of primarily factual questions in commercial transactions, but arbitration was
"not the proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional
questions or policy in the application of statutes." Cohen & Dayton, supra note 81, at 281.
83. See H.R. RaP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. RaP. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1 (1924).
84. See Hamilton v. Homes Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370, 385 (1890); Finance Co. v. Board of
Educ. of City of Rochester, 190 N.Y. 76, 82 N.E. 737 (1907); Haggart v. Morgan, 5 N.Y. 422,
427 (1851). See also Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 271, 130 N.E. 288, 290
(1921).
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such agreements were not specifically enforceable and could be revoked at any
time. 5 This judicial hostility to enforcement of arbitration agreements has ambiguous origins86 but apparently rested on two judicial concerns. First, many
courts reasoned that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute, if enforced, would
amount to an improper ouster of the court's jurisdiction."7 Judges viewed arbitration clauses as assaults on the judicial domain and therefore contrary to
public policy.88 Second, courts feared that arbitration agreements could be coerced
in a context of unequal bargaining power with the stronger party forcing the
weaker party to relinquish the right to a judicial forum.8 9 Common law resistance to specific enforcement of arbitration clauses was the focus of growing
criticism in the early twentieth century, and in 1920 New York became the
first state to enact legislation nullifying the common law view. 9°
The American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, using New York law as a model, drafted the original proposal
for a federal arbitration statute. 9' The proposal was introduced in Congress for
the first time in 1922,92 and the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony
on the bill in 192393 but did not take formal action. In 1924 the proposal was
the subject of a joint congressional hearing94 and ultimately passed both the
95
House and Senate without a dissenting vote.

85. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1924); Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801
(1960); Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir.
1942).
86. In Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d at 982-84, Judge
Frank noted the ambiguity of the common law approach and the variations in the grounds on
which the courts relied in declaring arbitration agreements against public policy and void, or
revocable and unenforceable. See also Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 14-15 (remarks of Julius
Cohen).
87. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 14-15 (remarks of Julius Cohen)
88. The Senate Report explicitly acknowledged that judicial self-interest might have motivated
the common law view. The Report cited as a reason for the hostility to arbitration enforcement
"[t]he [courts'] jealousy of their rights as courts, coupled with the fear that if arbitration agreements
were to prevail and be enforced, the courts would be ousted of much of their jurisdiction." Additionally, the Report suggested that the "[courts'] desire to retain, if not extend, their jurisdiction
had much to do with inspiring the fear that arbitration tribunals could not do justice between the
parties." S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924).
89. See Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 15 (remarks of Julius Cohen) ("[T]he fundamental
reason for it . . . was that at the time this [common law] rule was made people were not able to
take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them.").
90. N.Y. Arbitration Law, L. 1920, c. 275, Consol. c. 72. The New York Court of Appeals,
in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, upheld the arbitration legislation against a constitutional challenge
in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
91. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 1-3 (remarks by Charles Beinheimer); id. at 7-9
(remarks by W.H.H. Piatt).
92. S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 64 CoNo. REC. 732 (1922); H.R. 13522, 67th Cong.,
4th Sess., 64 CONO. REc. 797 (1922).
93. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25.
94. Joint Hearings, supra note 25. The hearings concerned the identical bill: S. 1005 and H.R.
646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted at 65 CONO. REc. 11,081 (1924).
95. The House passed the bill without amendment. 65 CONG. REc. 11,082 (1924). The Senate
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The unanimous votes in Congress belie the controversy surrounding the Act
in some commercial sectors at the time of its passage. The primary disagreement
concerned the advisability of including agreements to arbitrate future disputes within the scope of federal enforcement legislation. The federal Act's
opponents believed courts should not compel arbitration of disputes unknown
to parties at the time of agreement since an individual might unwittingly sign
away the right to a judicial forum for an important claim. 96 The federal Act's
legislative history does not reveal whether Congress was aware of such controversy. 97 Nevertheless, testimony suggests some members of Congress were concerned about the related problem of the Act's applicability to adhesion contracts.
When Senator Walsh of Montana voiced that concern during the 1923 hearing
on the proposed legislation, the bill's supporters assured Congress the bill was
not intended to cover insurance contracts or other "take it or leave it" arrangements.9 8 The proposed legislation, its supporters argued, simply would
empower courts to enforce arbitration clauses in arms-length transactions between merchants. 99 When the same question arose during the 1924 joint hearings, Julius Cohen, the bill's key drafter, told Congress that other federal
legislation would provide adequate protection against such abuses. 00 Congress,
perhaps relying on such assurances, did not include any language limiting the
Act's substantive command other than the employment contract exclusion in
section 1 and the saving clause of section 2.
B.

Congressional Authority

Congress's original understanding of the source of power underlying the
federal Arbitration Act is significant now because of what it reveals about the

passed an amended version, 66 CONG. REc. 2761, in which the House concurred. 66 CONG. REc.
3003. The only substantive amendment by the Senate was the elimination of a provision that would
have authorized federal court jurisdiction without regard to amount-in-controversy. See S. REP. No.
536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). The implication of the original provision and its elimination
is discussed at infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
96. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws opposed the applicability
of arbitration legislation to future disputes, and a heated debate over the issue occurred at the
1925 American Bar Convention when the proposed Uniform Arbitration Act came before the
Convention. See Report of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 50 A.B.A.
REP. 134, 134-62 (1925) for a report of the floor debate. The proposed Uniform Act, which received
the approval of the Convention, id. at 162, provided for enforcement of arbitration agreements
only as to existing controversies, id. at 591. The Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
Law, having drafted the federal legislation, strongly opposed the Uniform Act. See id. at 142, 149.
The Uniform Act today conforms to the federal model. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying
text.

97. Proponents of the Act repeatedly suggested to Congress that support for the bill was
universal. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 3 (remarks of Charles Beinheimer); id.
at 9 (remarks of W.H.H. Piatt); Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 5 (remarks of Senator Kendricks);
id. at 17 (remarks of Julius Cohen); id. at 21-22 (remarks of Charles Bernheimer). Indeed, the
American Bar Association Committee on Uniform State Laws objected after the fact to the implication in the testimony presented to Congress that support for the federal Act had been unanimous. See Committee on Uniform State Laws, 50 A.B.A. REP. 29, 45-59 (1925).
98. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 9-11.
99. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 9-11.
100. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 15.
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intended application of the Act. The Act on its face reveals three potential
bases of congressional authority: power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,"" power to legislate in the admiralty and maritime field, "'" and power
to establish procedures for lower federal courts."'" Although neither the SixtySeventh nor the Sixty-Eighth Congress directly addressed the question of underlying authority, "4 the legislative history reveals that the drafters viewed the
primary authority for the Act to be congressional power to regulate federal
court procedure.
In the 1924 joint hearings, Julius Cohen testified that the theory behind
the bill was that Congress "ha[d] the right to tell the Federal courts how to
proceed."""4 In his written statement submitted to Congress, Cohen outlined
the legal justification for the bill:
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its validity upon
the exercise of the interstate commerce and admiralty powers of Congress. This is not the fact.

The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal courts
for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts. So far as congressional acts relate to the
procedure
in the Federal courts, they are clearly within the congressional
06
power.1
Cohen's view of the enforceability of arbitration agreements as a matter of
procedure was consistent with the prevailing view of the law of remedies. Courts
of that era typically treated questions relating to remedies as "procedural" and

101. 9 U.S.C. 5§ 1-2 (1982) (quoted supra notes 23, 27 and accompanying text). The commerce
power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is a grant of plenary authority, and the courts apply the
deferential "rational basis" test in reviewing a congressional determination that an activity affects
interstate commerce. See, e.g, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S
264 (1981).
102. 9 U.S.C. 55 1-2 (1982). Congressional power over admiralty and maritime matters is
something of an anomaly in constitutional law. The grant of federal court jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime cases, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, serves as the basis not only for the creation of a
maritime common law by the federal courts, Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), but also for the enactment of federal statutory law on the subject. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 817-21 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
103. 9 U.S.C. 55 3-4, 9-12 (1982). Congress's power over federal court procedure derives from
the power to establish the lower federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8; id. art. III, S 1
104. When Congress did consider the question, it gave the issue only cursory attention:
Rep. Dyer. There is no question of the authority of Congress to legislate on this subject
as provided in the bill, is there?
The Chairman. I do not think there is.
Rep. Dyer. The authority and jurisdiction is ample?
The Chairman. Yes.
Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 24.
105. Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 37.
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therefore governed by the law of the forum. 7 Proponents of the arbitration
bill stressed the procedural characterization to counter fears that the legislation
might nullify substantive rights governed by state law.10 Moreover, the procedural characterization effectively answered potential due process objections that
might have been raised.' °9
In his written statement Cohen addressed the commerce and admiralty bases
underlying the bill and illuminated the relationship among the various sources
of power. In Cohen's opinion, Congress arguably had power to declare all
arbitration agreements in transactions involving commerce or admiralty enforceable, even in state courts."10 The only issue about which disagreement might
arise, Cohen believed, was whether the commerce power was broad enough to
support such legislation."' Cohen then clarified the Act's intended focus:
Even if, however, it should be held that Congress has no power to
declare generally that in all contracts relating to interstate commerce
arbitration agreements shall be valid, the present statute is not materially
affected. The primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in
the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose
Congress rests solely upon its2 power to prescribe the jurisdiction and
duties of the Federal courts."1
Cohen's concern over the potential reach of the commerce power suggests that
the drafters intended the basic mandate of enforceability to apply to state courts
if Congress had power to support such an application. Since such application

107. In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924), for example, the Supreme
Court upheld the New York courts' application of New York arbitration law to a dispute arising
under a maritime charter party. The Court reasoned the arbitration law affected only the remedy,
was therefore a matter of forum law, and did not unconstitutionally displace the substantive maritime
law. Id. at 124-25. See also Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 270, 130 N.E.
288, 289-90 (1921) (arbitration enforcement is matter of law of remedies and therefore governed
by forum law); Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 79, at 154-55.

108. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 37 (written statement of Julius Cohen) (legislation authorizing arbitration enforcement is matter of procedure and does not infringe on substantive contract

rights). See also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 81, at 276, 279.
109. In Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921), for example,
a due process challenge was brought against the New York arbitration legislation on the ground,
inter alia, that the law could not constitutionally be applied to contracts made before its enactment.
In rejecting the challenge, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the law made a change
in remedy only and therefore could be applied to contracts already made: "Changes in the form
of remedies are applicable to proceedings thereafter instituted for the redress of wrongs already

done." Id. at 270, 130 N.E. at 290.
110. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 38.

111.

Cohen explained:

It seems probable ... that Congress has ample power to declare that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce or admiralty transactions shall be recognized as
valid and enforceable even by State courts ....
The only questions which apparently can

be raised in this connection are whether the failure to enforce an agreement for arbitration
imposes such a direct burden upon interstate commerce as seriously to hamper it or whether
the enforcement of such a clause is of material benefit.
112.

Id.
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does not exceed constitutional limits under current constitutional theory, '"3 the
Act's substantive command applies to state and federal courts alike.
Notwithstanding the Act's application to state courts, Cohen believed the
Act's primary foundation was congressional power over federal court procedure, 1' 4 and the Sixty-Eighth Congress seems to have adopted Cohen's view of
the source of power. The House Report states the question of enforceability of
arbitration agreements is properly the subject of federal legislation since enforceability is a question of procedure. 115 The Report further explains that "[b]efore
such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is
essential. The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced
by the courts of the United States. The remedy is founded also upon the Federal
control over interstate commerce and over admiralty."11" 6 Likewise, the Senate
Report reveals the law's major impact was to be in federal court. The Report
declares the law was necessary because "[t]he Federal courts have in the main
been governed by the same rules [as the state courts] and, as a consequence,
have denied relief to the parties seeking to compel the performance of executory
agreements to settle and determine disputes by arbitration.""H7 Moreover, shortly
after the Act's passage, the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law wrote that the Act "rests upon the constitutional provision by
which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.
So far as congressional acts relate to procedure in the Federal courts, they are
' ' 8
clearly within the congressional power. 1
Congress's perception of its own source of power underlying the Act parallels
the drafters' desire to respect state sovereignty in matters of arbitration enforcement. During joint hearings, proponents of the bill assured Congress the
proposed law would not intrude on the domain of the states. Cohen explained:
[The proposed federal Act] is no infringement upon the right of each
State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its
laws. To be sure, whether or not a contract exists is a question of the
substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made. But
whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question
of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the remedy is sought."19

113. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S 264 (1981)
(Congress may constitutionally regulate activity so long as there is a rational basis for congressional
determination that activity affects interstate commerce.).
114. Indeed, after the passage of the Act, Cohen was ambivalent on the Act's applicability
in the state courts. In 1926 he contended that unless the amount-in-controversy requirement were
eliminated for diversity cases coming within the Act, judicial enforcement of many arbitration
agreements would be unavailable in the absence of comparable state legislation. See Cohen & Dayton,
supra note 81, at 267 n.. One can infer from his concern that he viewed the federal Act by itself
to be an insufficient basis for compelling arbitration enforcement in the state courts.
115. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
116. Id.
117. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
118. Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 79, at 154.
119. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 37.
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Similarly, Cohen insisted the Act was not intended "by means of the Federal
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration
enforcement.'

1

20

Congress's understanding, then, was that the federal Act was primarily an
exercise of congressional power over federal court procedure. While the general
command of section 2 contains no limitation to, federal courts, the Act's specific
provisions for judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and for confirmation, modification, or vacation of awards expressly apply only to federal
courts.' 2 1 In light of its view of the underlying source of power, Congress, had

no reason to expect any provision. of the Act beyond section 2 to be binding
on the states.
C.

Supreme Court Constructions

An accurate perception of the Arbitration Act's legislative history should
underlie the analysis of any problem relating to the Act's intended scope. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has persistently refused to acknowledge the key
components of that legislative history or has characterized them incorrectly. In
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 2 2 the Supreme Court held the commerce/
admiralty connection applied to all provisions of the Act even though only section 2 explicitly refers to arbitration agreements with the requisite connection.
The Court seemed to base its decision on a desire to avoid a thorny constitutional question rather than on candid examination of legislative history. 23 In
Bernhardt, the Court considered whether a federal court in a diversity suit must
apply the stay provisions of section 3 of the Act where the arbitration agreement was not in a transaction involving interstate commerce or admiralty. 4
Significantly, the applicable state law in Bernhardt did not recognize enforceability of arbitration agreements.1 25 If the Court had construed the Act to extend
to such a situation, it would have had to decide whether Congress, in the exercise of its control over federal court procedure, could have constitutionally
26
enacted a rule for federal courts that arguably touched on substantive rights.
27
Since the Court believed that section 3, so. construed, would be invalid

120. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 40.

121. See 9 U.S.C. SS 3-4, 9-11 (1982), discussed at supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
122.

350 U.S. 198 (1956).

123. &e id. at 202-05.
124. Id. at 200-01. The Court in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp.,
293 U.S. 449 (1935) had applied the Act in a diversity case without requiring a showing of
involvement in interstate commerce. The Bernhardt Court, however, gave little weight to Shanferoke

since the Shanferoke was pre-Erie and had not addressed the question whether arbitration enforcement
touched on substantive rights. See 350 U.S. at 202.
125. 350 U.S. at 204-05 (interpreting law of Vermont).
126. Id. at 202.
127. The Court reasoned that arbitration enforcement affected substantive rights and therefore
should be governed by "local law" under Eri. 'If the federal court allows arbitration where the
state court would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit
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2
the Court read section 3 narrowly to avoid the issue.
Congress probably intended the commerce/admiralty requirement to apply
throughout the Act, as held in Bernhardt, but the Bernhardt Court did not adequately justify that conclusion. Although the pre-Erie Congress evidently was
more confident of its authority to enact the legislation as an exercise of power
over federal court procedure than as an exercise of commerce and admiralty
powers, 1 29 Congress drew on all available relevant powers. Since commerce and
admiralty powers served as potential bases of authority, Congress presumably
intended to apply these bases throughout the Act. 130 More importantly, Congress
perceived a great need for arbitration enforcement in interstate and international
commercial transactions.' 3 ' Draftsman Cohen, for example, referred to the bill
as "a great tonic that is needed to strengthen this patient in the field of commercial activity.' ' 32 To the extent Congress intended to impose a commerce/
admiralty requirement beyond section 2, it did so arguably as an effort to tailor
the Act to fit the problem. The inference of such a requirement should not
rest on the premise, implicit in Bernhardt, that Congress relied primarily on its
commerce and admiralty powers in enacting provisions other than section 2.
In a later decision, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., '33
the Supreme Court went further and announced a view of the Act's legislative
history that is an outright mischaracterization. In Prima Paint, the Court faced
the question whether a federal court, in ruling on a request for a stay pending
arbitration, should resolve a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire
contract or whether the matter is to be referred to arbitrators. In New York,
where the case arose, the law was unclear concerning whether such a claim of

is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects
the cause of action created by the State." Id. at 203.
"Our view . . . is that § 3, so read, would invade the local law field. We therefore read
128.
3 to avoid that issue." Id. at 202. In concurrence, Justice Frankfurter agreed with the majority
that the Act should be construed so as to avoid the constitutional issue, but he used ambiguously
broad language. See id. at 205-12. He wrote: "Since the United States Arbitration Act of 1925
does not obviously apply to diversity cases, in the light of its terms and the relevant interpretative
materials, avoidance of the constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a
construction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases." Id. at 208. Although his comments
might suggest the Act should never be applied in diversity cases, see Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960),
it is more likely he meant the mere presence of diversity alone should not trigger application of
the Act.
129. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
130. Indeed, at various points in the legislative deliberations, proponents of the bill described
it as affecting only arbitration agreements in interstate or foreign commerce. See S. REP. No. 536,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) ("The 'maritime transactions or contracts,' to which the bill will
apply, are defined in section 1. Likewise, the definition of 'commerce' . . . shows to what contracts
in interstate or foreign commerce the bill will be applicable."); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
2st Sess 1 (1924) (purpose of bill is "to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration
contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or
which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts."); Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 7
(statement of Charles Bernheimer).
131.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 2 (statement of Charles Bernheimer); Joint
Hearings, supra note 25, at 7, 9 (statement of Charles Bernheimer).
132. Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 16.
133. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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fraud would have been decided by the court or arbitrators.' 34 The Court held
that under sections 3 and 4 of the Act an arbitration clause is separable from
the contract in which it appears and a federal court should consider only issues
relating to making and performing the arbitration agreement itself.'13 In upholding Congress's power to fashion such a rule, the Court concluded that
Congress relied solely on its interstate commerce and admiralty powers in en6
acting the legislation.'1
"[I]t is clear beyond dispute," wrote Justice Fortas for the Court, "that
the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable
federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and admiralty.' "137
Justice Fortas evidently disregarded key testimony submitted at joint hearings
and explanatory statements in the House Report, and found "no indication in
the statute or legislative history that Congress relied on any source of authority
138
other than the commerce and admiralty powers.'
In dissent, Justice Black sharply criticized the majority for its characterization
of the Act's legislative history and its distortion of the Act's intended effect. 39
In Justice Black's view, Congress's sole objective was to provide a remedy in
federal courts for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, and neither
the language nor the history of the Act justified creating federal substantive
law to displace state law.' 40 Justice Black, relying on the saving clause of section
2 and complementary language in section 4, argued that questions of an arbitration agreement's existence and defenses to its enforcement should be decided according to state law."4 '
Without doubt, the dissent's general construction of the Act more closely
approximates Congress's actual intent. Nevertheless, the separability doctrine
might be a fair reading of the statutory language of section 4, and nothing in
the legislative history strongly contradicts the Court's conclusion. The danger
of the majority's approach is in its characterization of the Act as resting solely
on congressional commerce and admiralty powers. By disregarding the statute's
predominantly procedural origin, the majority opened the way for future
preemptive applications of the statute that would intrude unduly on substantive
state policy. 42

134. 388 U.S. at 400 n.3.,
135. Id. at 403-04.
136. Id. at 404-05.
137. Id. at 405.
138. Id. at 405 n.13.
139. Id. at 407-25 (Black, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Stewart joined the dissent.
140. Justice Black argued that "[o]ne cannot read the legislative history without concluding
that [the power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the federal courts], and not Congress'
power to legislate in the area of commerce, was the 'principal basis' of the 'Act." Id. at 419.
Justice Black also relied on "the frequent statements in the legislative history that the Act was not
intended to be 'the source of ... substantive law.' " Id.
141. Id. at 412-16.
142. Ironically, the Court's selective reading of the legislative history was unnecessary to the
decision, since Congress constitutionally could create substantive rules under the Act so long as
control over federal court procedure was not the only source of congressional power. Congressional
power to regulate commerce, whether standing alone or in conjunction with other sources of congressional power, clearly provides Congress with authority to enact "substantive" law. See supra note
101.
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In its most recent consideration of the authority underlying the Act, the
Supreme Court again failed to accurately characterize the legislative history. In
Keating, the Court faced the question whether the Act applied in state courts
and, if so, whether a state court could refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement
within the Act on the basis of state protective legislation made non-waivable
under state law. 143 The plaintiffs in Keating, a group of franchisees, sued their
franchisor in California state court alleging fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the California Franchise Investment Law. 4 ' Because each franchise
agreement included an arbilration clause, the franchisor moved for an order
compelling arbitration of all claims under the federal Arbitration Act.'4 5 The
4
litigation raised the question of whether the federal Act applied in state court' '
and, if so, whether it preempted a provision of the Franchise Investment Law
declaring remedies under the law non-waivable. The California Supreme Court
held that the federal Act applied but that it did not preempt the strong investorprotective policy of the Franchise Investment Law. 47 Under the state court
ruling, the plaintiffs' common law claims were arbitrable, but the state statutory
claim had to be resolved in a judicial forum.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case required the Court
once again to address the source of congressional power underlying the Act. If
Congress had relied solely on its power over federal court procedure, then the
Act could not constitutionally bind state courts. In an opinion authored by the
Chief Justice, 4 " the Court found the Act "rests on the authority of Congress
to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause."' 4 9 Because of the limitation in section 2 to transactions in commerce or admiralty, the majority
reasoned Congress could not have intended for the Act to apply only in federal
court. 51 Chief Justice Burger also suggested if the Act were construed to apply
only in federal court, it would invite forum shopping."' The majority concluded
"the 'involving commerce' requirement in [section] 2 [was] not . . . an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but [w]as a necessary

143.
144.

104 S. Ct. 852, 855 (1984).
CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977). The proceeding was a class action on behalf of

about 800 California franchisees. 104 S. Ct. at 855.

145.

104 S. Ct. at 855.

146. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.
Court presumed the Act applied in state court
unnecessary to the holding in the case. For a
and accompanying text.
147. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.

v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the
proceedings, id. at 23-27, but the presumption was
discussion of Moses H. Cone see infra notes 239-48

3d 584, 596-605, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198-1204, 183
Cal. Rptr. 360, 366-72 (1982).
148. The Chief Justice's decision to author the majority opinion is consistent with his concern
for what he views as the excessive litigiousness of our society and the inadequacy of the existing
court system to produce justice. See Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982)
(annual report on the state of the judiciary).
149. 104 S. Ct. at 858.
150. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[i]f it is correct that Congress sought only to create
a procedural remedy in the federal courts, there can be no explanation for the express limitation
in the Arbitration Act to contracts 'involving commerce.' " Id. at 860.

151.

Id.
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qualification on a statute intended to apply in state and federal courts.' 152 The
Court found that Congress intended to foreclose all state legislative attempts to
and went on to hold that
undercut enforceability of arbitration agreements,
53
section 2 of the Act preempted the state law.'
In dissent Justice O'Connor challenged the majority's conclusions regarding
the source of congressional power underlying the Act.'- Justice O'Connor argued the legislative history "established conclusively that the 1925 Congress
viewed the [Act] as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts,
derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts."' 5 5 In addition, she contended even if section
2 were construed to create a federal right the state courts must enforce, no
basis existed for applying sections 3 and 4- to states, as the majority seemed
to do.'5 6 In her view, unless Congress specifically set up procedures applicable
to state courts, those courts should be permitted to develop and follow their
own methods for enforcing the section 2 right. 5 7 Finally, in responding to the
majority's forum-shopping point, Justice O'Connor explained that where a basis
for federal court jurisdiction exists, either party has access to the federal forum. 1m
Hence, forum shopping as a litigation strategy would be ineffective even if the
Act were construed to apply only in federal courts.
Neither Justice O'Connor's approach nor that of the majority adequately
reflects the Act's legislative history. On one hand, Justice O'Connor gave too
little weight to the fact that section 2 applies on its face to all arbitration
agreements in transactions involving interstate commerce or admiralty. Although
doubts existed as to the reach of the commerce power, the key drafter's testimony suggests the general command of enforceability was meant to apply in
state court if the commerce power would support such an application.1 59 On
the other hand, the majority disregarded testimony during the hearings as well
as statements in the House and Senate Reports showing the Act was intended
primarily to govern procedure in federal courts.' 6° As in the past, the Court
relied on a selective reading of legislative history. By focusing exdusively on
the commerce and admiralty foundation for the Act and refusing to acknowledge
Congress's original perception of the Act as procedural, the Court cleared the
way for a finding of broad preemptive design.
IV.
A.

PREEMPTION AND CHOICE OF LAW

The Keating Holding and Choice of Substantive Law

The broad command of section 2 of the Arbitration Act stands in sharp
contrast to Congress's arguably narrow goal in enacting the legislation, and for

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 861. The preemption holding is discussed more fully in infia Part III.
104 S. Ct. at 864-71. Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 868-69.
Id at 869-70.
Id. at 870-71.

159.
160.

See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-09, 114-18 and accompanying text.
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this reason determination of the Act's preemptive effect is problematic. In resolving the preemption question in Keating, the Court failed to acknowledge the
limited nature of the congressional objective. Although the Keating holding might
be a reasonable interpretation of bare statutory language, the Court's nullification of California's substantive policy swings "the federal bludgeon" in a
manner not contemplated by the early Congress.
The California Franchise Investment Law voided any purported waiver of
statutory terms, and the California Supreme Court interpreted this anti-waiver
1 61
language to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the statute.
In holding that claims under the Franchise Investment Law were nonarbitrable
despite the federal Arbitration Act, the California high court analogized the
provision to the similar anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act of 1933.162
The court noted that in Wilko v. Swan the United States Supreme Court had
recognized the existence of a strong federal policy favoring enforcement of the
securities laws 1 63 and had held the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act
64
By analto invalidate arbitration agreements encompassing securities claims.'
ogy, the California Supreme Court reasoned the Franchise Investment Law
provided special protection for rights and remedies favored under state law.'
The court concluded the pro-arbitration principles of the federal Act were not
"so unyielding as to require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute
over the application of a regulatory statute which a state legislature, in conformity with analogous federal policy, has decided should be left to judicial
66
enforcement. '
The United States Supreme Court rejected the California court's reasoning
but gave only cursory attention to the preemption question. Chief Justice Burger
found the analogy to Wilko v. Swan to be flawed because Wilko involved the
interrelationship between two federal statutes while Keating concerned the impact
of a federal statute on state law. 67 Because the state statute required judicial
consideration of claims brought under it, the statute "directly conflicts with
68
[section] 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause."'

CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977), part of the Franchise Investment Law, provided:
161.
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to
waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." The
California Supreme Court held that the provision nullified waivers, through arbitration clauses or
otherwise, of the right to a judicial forum. See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 596605, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198-1204, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 366-72 (1982).
162. See section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982), quoted at note 43
supra. The antiwaiver language of the California law had apparently been modeled after § 14. See
infra note 165.
163. 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953).
164. Id. at 438. For a discussion of the Wilko exception to arbitrability, see text accompanying

notes 41-47 supra.
165. The California court found that the California legislators looked to the Securities Act of
1933 as their model for the Franchise Investment Lav and that they intended for the non-waiver
provision to be interpreted in accord with Wilko. 31 Cal. 3d at 598-600, 645 P.2d at 1199-1200,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
166. Id. at 605, 645 P.2d at 1203-04, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72.
167. 104 S. Ct. at 861 n.ll.
168. Id. at 858.
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The Kealing Court's approach to the issue of preemption contrasts with the
Court's frequent formulations of preemption standards in other contexts through
which the Burger Court has made dear that congressional intent to preempt
should not be inferred lightly. 6 9 Indeed, the Court has explained often that
federal supremacy should be invoked only where Congress clearly intended it. 170
The Court has cautioned that preemption analysis should begin with a presumption that Congress did not intend -to displace state law.' 7 1 Moreover, the
Court's typical preemption standard posits that a finding of preemption is justified only if Congress has comprehensively occupied a given field and entirely
72
displaced state regulation or if state law unavoidably conflicts with federal law.
In enacting the federal Arbitration Act, Congress did not comprehensively
occupy a field, thereby displacing all state regulatory authority, nor did it
unmistakably oust state power to require judicial forums for certain favored
claims. Through the Act Congress intended to overcome long-standing judicial
hostility toward enforcement of arbitration agreements, and hearings on the Act
show Congress was addressing that antiquated common law practice. 73 Nothing
in the Act's history indicates Congress meant to preempt state statutory policies
favoring judicial resolution of particular categories of claims. The Act's drafters
believed the Act would not displace state autonomy in matters of contract and
assured Congress that states would not be compelled by the Act to enforce

169. For example, in the same term it decided Keating, the Court held in Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984), that the extensive federal regulation of the nuclear energy
industry through the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt state punitive damage remedies. The
Court explained that "preemption should be judged . . . on whether there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in
a damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law." Id. at 626. Similarly, one year
earlier the Court held that the states could carry out economic regulation of the nuclear power
industry without inevitably conflicting with federal safety regulations under the Atomic Energy Act.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
205-23 (1983). One student of the Burger Court's preemption decisions has observed that the Court
generally has allowed state legislation to stand where Congress has not made clear its intention to
preempt or where a conflict is peripheral to the federal statutory purpose. See Note, The Preemption
Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 623, 640-49 (1975).
170. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 625 (1984); New York State
Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 404 U.S.
282, 288-90 (1971)).
171. E.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
172. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). Interestingly, the Court has displayed restraint in ruling on a preemption
question concerning arbitration. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973), the Court held that a New York Stock Exchange rule requiring arbitration of any controversy
arising from employment termination did not preempt a state law nullifying arbitration clauses in
individual actions for wages. The Court's analysis focused, in part, on the divergent purposes of
the Exchange rule -and the state law at issue, and the Court concluded the federal goal of ensuring
fair dealing and protecting investors did not require employee arbitration.. Id. at 134-36. The Court,
in effect, found that since the conflict between the federal rule and the state law was "peripheral"
to the federal legislative goal, there was no preemption. Id. at 135. See also Note, supra note 169,
at 648-49.
173. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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arbitration agreements. 17 4 If, as Julius Cohen envisioned, state law would control
the substantive issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate while federal
law would govern the procedural issue of enforceability, then surely state law
could nullify an agreement on the basis of state substantive policy. 7 5 Contrary
to the Court's conclusion in Keating, the historical record indicates that the
Sixty-Eighth Congress would not have intended its primarily "procedural" statute to override state legislation creating rights and remedies in favor of particular
groups.
A more legitimate interpretation of the Act would require states to recognize
enforceability of arbitration agreements as a general matter, but allow states to
ensure judicial resolution of particular claims favored under state law. Such an
approach squares with the statutory language of section 2 in two ways. First,
an "agreement to arbitrate" within the meaning of section 2 arguably must
exist under state law before the federal mandate of enforceability comes into
play. If state law prohibits agreements to arbitrate particular claims, not because
of generalized hostility toward arbitration but because of a substantive policy
favoring the claims in question, a valid "agreement" required to trigger section
2 does not exist.
This deference to state substantive law policy has indirect support in case
law and in the Act's legislative history. Although many courts have held that
all questions arising under the Act must be resolved according to federal common law," 6 a few courts have concluded that the existence of an arbitration
agreement should be decided according to state law. 77 Moreover, testimony
during hearings on the legislation suggests the Act was meant to create a federal
remedy against a backdrop of state contract law."1s Julius Cohen emphasized
the bill would not affect the substantive law of contracts, and noted it would
not infringe "upon the right of each State to decide for itself what contracts
shall or shall not exist under its laws."1 79 He and others pointed out that
arbitration enforcement legislation would not create a rule of validity where one

174. See supra
175. Id.
176. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1980); Collins
Co. v. Devonshire

notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22 (5th
Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1972); Robert Lawrence
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).

See also Furnish, Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REv.

317, 325 (1979) (If a contract falls within the federal Arbitration Act, "[tihe court must proceed
to consider the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement according to the standards of the
U.S. Arbitration Act and no other.").
177. See Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979);
Duplan Corp. v. W.B. David Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
178. In this respect, Congress was acting in accordance with Professor Mishkin's postulate that Congress legislates against a background of state law, changing it only where necessary to
accomplish the federal goal. &e Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decisions, 105 U. PA. L. REV.

797, 811 (1957). Cf 28

U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
179.

Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 40.
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did not already exist.L8° Similarly, the bill's supporters characterized it as the
abrogation of the rule of equity against specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements 8' and "an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do iL"les The House Report embraced such views by emphasizing
1
that the bill affected questions of procedure rather than substance. 8
The legislative history, then, suggests that Congress did not intend the Act
to give rise to a new federal common law of contracts. The United States
Supreme Court accordingly could have interpreted section 2 to apply only to
agreements recognized as valid under state substantive law. In Keating, however,
the Court rejected such an approach. Because the Court refused to give effect
to California's substantive policy of protecting franchise investors, the choice
of law theory underlying the decision is that federal common law determines
both the existence and the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Under the
holding in Keating, the Act supersedes state substantive law that either singles
out arbitration agreements for special requirements 84 or favor particular claims
by establishing a non-waivable right to a judicial forum. 85
Alternatively, the saving clause of section 2 could have provided a vehicle
for recognizing state substantive policies in Keating Section 2 mandates that
arbitration agreements within the Act "shall be valid, irevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."1116 The House Report explained the effect of this language:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of
the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement.
He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement
is placed upon the same
187
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.

180. See Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 39-40. On the floor of the House, Congressman
Graham explained that the proposed Act "does not involve any new principle of law except to
provide a simple method ... in order to give enforcement.... It creates no new legislation,
grants no new aights, except a Temedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in
admiralty contracts." 65 CoNo. Rae. 1931 (1924).
181. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 6 (statement of Senator Walsh) ("[T]he

purpose of this statute is to overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce
and [sic] arbitration agreement? That is really 'the -urpose of it, is it not?").
182. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
183. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th 'Cong_, 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
184.

See, e.g., Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 748 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1984)

(Alabama law imposing special requirements for arbitration agreement to be valid was preempted
by federal Arbitration Act).
185. Apart from such "discriminatory" state law, Keating leaves the courts free -to apply state
contract principles in determining the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements. The
federal common law under the Act, in other words, should incorporate the general contract law
of -the individual states. See generally Note, Incorporation of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
78 MmiH. L. REv. 1391 (1980). See also infra 'notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
186. 9 'U.S.C. S 2 (1982).
187. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
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The saving clause plainly subjects arbitration agreements to the same defenses
available against other contracts. Because the state statute in Keating effectively
nullified the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement, arguably the clause,
like any contract nullified by state law, was unenforceable.' 8
The majority rejected the saving clause argument in Keating. The Court
explained that the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law was not a ground for revocation of "any contract," but only a
ground for revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California statute.' 89 The majority also expressed fear that "states could wholly
eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same
footing as other contracts,' . . . simply by passing statutes such as the Franchise
Investment Law."190
The majority's analysis is superficial, since any defense can be defined in
such specific terms that it will relate only to the contract in question. 9' An
approach more consonant with the statutory purpose would examine the nature
of the defense. If the defense reflected a uniform policy against enforcement of
arbitration clauses generally, it would not be a ground for revocation of any
contract.' 92 If, on the other hand, an independent state interest were at stake,
such as judicial protection of particular statutory rights and remedies, the defense
could be honored. In Keating the California statute voided arbitration clauses
in franchise agreements because of the state's special concern for protecting the
franchise investor. In such a circumstance the waiver of judicial forum violated
a public policy unrelated to arbitration. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, relying in part on speculative fears, construed the saving clause to exclude defenses
based on state statutory guarantees of judicial trial. In so holding, the Court
elevated the federal remedy of arbitration enforcement to a position never envisioned by its drafters.
Keating, then, has direct implications for choice of law problems arising under
section 2 of the Act. As long as the Keating approach prevails, federal law
governs all questions relating to existence and enforceability of arbitration agreements, including availability of defenses pursuant to the saving clause.' 93 The

188. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Keating, advanced such a contention: "A contract which is
deemed void is surely revocable at law or in equity, and the California legislature has declared
all conditions purporting to waive compliance with the protections of the Franchise Disclosure Act,
including but not limited to arbitration provisions, void as a matter of public policy." 104 S. Ct.
at 863.
189. Id. at 861 n.ll.

190.

Id.

191. As noted by Justice Stevens, contracts other than arbitration agreements were subject to
the nonwaiver provision of California law. See supra note 188.
192. It is unlikely that a state would revert to such a policy in this day of congested court
dockets. Commercial arbitration legislation has been enacted in almost every state. See supra note
66.
193. The construction of a federal statute is, of course, a federal question and gives rise to
federal common law. See Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. Rav. 311, 331-36 (1980). What was unclear prior to Keating was the extent to which
the federal Arbitration Act displaced state contract law and the extent to which state law continued
to operate of its own force. See, e.g., Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135,
137 (4th Cir. 1979). In light of Keating, the question now is whether federal law should incorporate
state law as the rule of decision. See Note, supra note 185, at 1392 n.8.
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content of the federal common law after Keating is more ambiguous. It may
include principles of state contract law as long as the rule in question does not
conflict with the "national policy favoring arbitration.' 1 94 Thus, while a court
may not incorporate a state rule of decision that is hostile to arbitration generally
or that favors judicial resolution of particular claims, 195 a state rule that neither
burdens the right to arbitration nor protects the right to a judicial forum may
properly provide the source of applicable law. Indeed, when confronted with
the need to fill in gaps in other federal statutes, the Supreme Court has indicated
that state law presumptively applies unless a nationally uniform rule is required
or unless application of state law would otherwise frustrate the purpose of the
federal program. 196 Such a presumption is particularly appropriate in the context
of arbitration enforcement, because Congress never intended to authorize development of a separate federal common law of contracts. 97 Moreover, the
asserted objective of placing arbitration agreements "on the same footing as
other contracts" ' 98 does not require development of a uniform national law of
contracts. Hence, courts should look to state law on questions such as fraud,
unconscionability, mistake, and other defenses justifying revocation of any contract. 199

194. See 104 S. Ct. at 858.
195. In enacting the Arbitration Act, Congress "withdrew the power of the states to require
a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration." Id.
196. &e, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29 (1979) (state law
adopted to determine priority of competing federal and private liens); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956) (state law adopted to determine meaning of "children" as used in Copyright Act). See generally Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1976).

197. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 185, at 1400-06. But see
Goodwin v. Elkins, 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) (although contract law in federal court is
normally matter of state law, Congress intended through Arbitration Act to establish uniform federal
law over contracts falling within scope of Act).
198. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
199. The strong federal policy favoring arbitration recognized by the United States Supreme
Court, see, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242-43 (1985); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 858 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), and by lower courts, see, e.g., Sharon Seed Corp. v.
Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1984); Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron
Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976); Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801
(1960), lacks a firm statutory foundation and should not be parlayed into a justification for creation
of a uniform federal common law of contracts governing arbitration agreements. The language of
§ 2 requires that arbitration agreements be treated as any other contract, and the legislative history
shows Congress intended to place arbitration agreements on a par with other contracts. See H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). Proponents of the bill before Congress, moreover,
were frustrated over the courts' refusal to enforce arms-length transactions but did not argue that
arbitration should be compelled when the parties'intentions were in doubt. See, e.g., Hearings on S.
4214, supra note 25, at 2-3 (remarks of Charles Bernheimer). In articulating a policy that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, courts frequently cite to precedent involving arbitration
in the labor context, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S.Ct.
3346, 3354 (1985) (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 547
(1960)); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1984) (same),
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Federal Preemption of State Procedures to Enforce Arbitration

As suggested in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Keating,2°° the debate over
the source of congressional power underlying the Act is relevant to another
aspect of preeemption. If, as the legislative history indicates, Congress intended
the command of section 2 to apply to state and federal courts alike, and the
remainder of the Act to govern only federal courts, then courts should give to
the Act an appropriately narrow preemptive effect. While the substantive command oi section 2 binds the states, state courts should be free to fashion their
own procedures and remedies for complying with the command.
The Arbitration Act does require states to provide judicial enforcement machinery, but no evidence exists to suggest Congress wanted to make detailed
federal court procedures binding on state court actions. Thus, state courts need
not adopt specific enforcement methods provided in sections 3 and 4, nor should
they be bound by specific procedures for vacating or modifying arbitration
awards under sections 10 and 11 of the Act.20 ' Nevertheless, the command of
section 2 effectively requires that states provide certain procedures. Because
Congress intended to override the common law refusal to specifically enforce
arbitration agreements, the command of section 2 requires that courts have
some method available to compel arbitration. Contrary to Justice O'Connor's
suggestion in Keating,20 2 availability of a damages remedy would be insufficient

even though the Supreme Court itself has contrasted the role of arbitration in the labor context
with its function in the commercial context, see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (arbitration in labor context is substitute for industrial strife, while
commercial arbitration is substitute for litigation). See Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration
Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 B.U.L. REv. 571, 592 (1972) (suggesting the courts have
erroneously transposed the policy favoring labor arbitration to the commercial arena).
200. "Assuming, to the contrary, that § 2 does create a federal right that the state courts must
enforce, state courts should nonetheless be allowed, at least in the first instance, to fashion their
own procedures.
... 104 S. Ct. at 868 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
201.
For example, 5 4 provides that an application for an order compelling arbitration be made
upon five days' written notice to the party in default and that service be made according to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 U.S.C. 5 4 (1982), quoted supra note 32. The Uniform Arbitration Act, on the other hand, adopts the procedural rules of the court that is entertaining the
application. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 16, 7 U.L.A. 73 (1981). Similarly, the federal Act requires
that notice of a motion to vacate be served within three months after the award if filed or delivered,
982
9 U.S.C. § 12 (1
), whereas the Uniform Act provides that an application to vacate an award
"shall be made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except
that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety
days after such grounds are known or should have been known." UNIT. ARB. ACT 5 12, 7 U.L.A.
55 (1981). See Downing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Mich. App. 96, 101-02, 317 N.W.2d 302, 305
(1982) (court raises but does not resolve question whether time provisions of federal Act apply
when relief from arbitration award is sought in state court).
Although the Act's history and language support the view that only the substantive command
of § 2 applies to the states, most courts have asumed that S 3, prescribing procedures for obtaining
a stay in federal court pending arbitration, is binding on state courts. See Merill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Mc~ollum, 105 S. Ct. 811, 812 n.2 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of pet. for cert.) (finding "no substantial disagreement among the state courts over § 3's
applicability"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790 (Fla.
App. 1981).
202. 104 S. Ct. at 869.
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under the Act.2 0 3 Likewise, in a*state court proceeding to which the federal Act
applies, the state court should substantially adhere to the grounds set out in
sections 10 and 11 for modifying or vacating an award. Because the federal
Act insulates awards from judicial review, save for errors of form, factual mistakes, or misconduct of arbitrators, a state court's vacation of an award for
2
errors of law would undermine the federal right. 0
A corollary is that federal common law developed under the Act is binding
on state courts to the extent such common law derives from the general command of section 2. If, on the other hand, the common law rule arises from
the Act's procedural provisions, then the rule should not control state court
actions. Nevertheless, many courts have referred to the federal common law of
the Act without distinguishing that arising under section 2 from the principles

203. The enacting Congress was aware of the availability of an award of damages for breach
of arbitration agreements, and it was the inadequacy of that remedy that created the demand for
the more effective remedy of specific enforcement. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1924); Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 6 (Senator Walsh); Joint Hearings, supra note
25, at 14-15, 38 (statement of Julius Cohen).
204. A related question is whether, in actions to enforce arbitration clauses governed by the
Arbitration Act, state door-closing statutes and other neutral limitations on court access should
control. For example, in Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 550 F.2d 1320
(2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit addressed the applicability of a New York door-closing statute
in a diversity action brought under S 3 of the Arbitration Act. Section 1312 of the New York
Business Corporation Law precluded a non-qualifying foreign corporation from suing in state court.
Id at 1321. Viewing S 1312 as a statutory conferral of capacity to sue, the court held the statute
inapplicable, reasoning that it had no relation to substantive rights and that a strong federal interest
underlay the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1324-26. The court found the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), inapplicable since in the case before it the relevant substantive law was
federal: "That B.C.L. S 1312(a) may now be applied to Grand Bahama so as to frustrate the
petitioner's access to a federal forum to litigate an admittedly federal matter and thereby limit the
uniform and effective application of a federal statute ... is a result not contemplated by Erie."
550 F.2d at 1326. The court thus distinguished Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949), where the Supreme Court ruled that a federal diversity court must apply a local doorclosing statute. The Second Circuit's analysis reflects its evident disagreement with the Woods
holding. See 550 F.2d at 13,26 (quoting Woods, 337 U.S. at 539) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (federal
court's application of door-closing statute is unwarranted expansion of statute's terms). The court
suggested that the application of a door-closing statute in a case involving interstate commerce
would raise constitutional problems. 550 F.2d at 1326. The Second Circuit, moreover, was of the
opinion that the statute by its terms did not apply to the plaintiff. 550 F.2d at 1327.
The Grand Bahama approach, even after Kealing, overstates the preemptive effect of the Arbitration
Act. In addressing questions such as these, courts should remain sensitive to the basic tenet that
Congress legislates against a background of existing state law, and that it alters or supplants legal
relationships established by states only to the extent necessary to accomplish the federal purpose.
See HART & WEcHsLsas, supra note 102, at 470-71. By attributing to the Arbitration Act a sweeping
federal policy, the Grand Bahama court disregarded the limited goal underlying the Act. Congress
did not create a statute of super-enforceability for arbitration agreements, and there is no evidence
Congress intended to displace state capacity-to-sue laws or other neutral limitations on access to
the courts. Section 1312 reflects a legislative policy in the state of New York to encourage registration
by foreign corporations doing business in the state, and it is a policy that state courts and federal
courts sitting in diversity should respect until confronted with an overriding federal policy. See
Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madias, 717 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1983). In light of the
narrow objective of the Arbitration Act, there is no basis for a federal court to disregard such
neutral state law limitations.
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arising under the procedural provisions, and have assumed that the whole common law applies in full to the states.2 " 5 While such an approach has the virtue
of simplicity, it exaggerates the Act's intended preemptive effect.
For example, although courts today uniformly assume that in proceedings
within the purview of the federal Act the rule of separability established in
Prima Paint controls in state and federal court, 20 6 arguably the rule should not
be considered binding on state courts. In Prima Paint the Supreme Court read
section 4 of the Act to preclude resolution in federal court of a claim of fraud
in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause. 20 7 Under the
Court's interpretation, such a claim is for arbitrators to resolve, and the federal
court may hear only a claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
agreement itself.208 The Court reasoned further that the standard of section 4
applied equally to applications for a stay under section 3, because "it is inconceivable that Congress intended the rule to differ depending upon which
party to the arbitration agreement first invokes the assistance of a federal court.""
The Court's analysis plainly tied the rule of separability to the Act's procedural
provisions facially applicable only to federal courts. Unless the separability rule
derives additionally from the substantive command of section 2, state courts
should remain free to disregard it. 2 10 Arguably, a court's resolution of a claim
of fraud in the container contract would not impinge on the section 2 mandate
since the right to specific performance of a valid arbitration agreement would
remain intact. The decision on the entire contract's validity, however, would
be made by the judge rather than the arbitrators.
State courts need not accede wholesale to the procedural provisions of the
federal Act. Congress did not intend such a removal of state autonomy and,

205. See, e.g, Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19,
24-26, 136 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380-81 (1977); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 199, 20102, 597 P.2d 380, 382 (1979). Cf Goodwin v. Elkins, 730 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir. 1984) (federal
Arbitration Act creates uniform federal law over contracts within its scope).
206. See, e.g., Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 199, 201, 597 P.2d 380, 382 (1979).
207. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967):
Under § 4 . . . the federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it is
satisfied that "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with
the arbitration agreement] is not in issue." Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself - an issue which goes to the "making" of the
agreement to arbitrate - the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory
language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement
of the contract generally.
Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 404.
210. At least one federal court concluded prior to Prima Paint that the separability rule arose
not from the procedural terms of § 4 but from the general command of § 2. Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960) (separability rule derives from language of § 2, historical treatment of arbitration agreements, and federal policy of promoting arbitration). Because there was thus clear precedent linking
the separability rule to § 2, the Supreme Court's careful reliance on only §§ 3 and 4 of the Act
might suggest a conscious effort to fashion a doctrine applicable only to the federal courts. See
Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 22-23
(1968).
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indeed, any such displacement would run counter to the drafters' expressed
federalism concerns. 211 The overriding question in deciding whether procedural
provisions of the Act and corresponding common law apply in state court should
21 2
be whether section 2 requires recognition of the federal rule in question.
V.

INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

A.

JudicialJurisdiction

The primary focus of congressional concern during hearings on the Arbitration Act was the remedial authority of federal courts rather than state courts,
and the Act clearly creates federal substantive and procedural law. Nevertheless,
the Act is anomalous in that it neither contains an independent grant of federalquestion jurisdiction nor provides "arising under" jurisdiction for purposes of
23
section 1331 of the United States Judicial Code.
The statute on its face and the legislative history show that Congress did
not intend to enlarge the jurisdiction of federal courts. Three provisions of the
Act are explicit on this point. Section 3 authorizes a stay "[i]f any suit or
proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration. ' 21 4 Section 4 limits application of the section to "any
United States district court which, save for [the arbitration agreement], would
have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject

211. See supra notes 119-20, 179-83 and accompanying text.
212. New York courts have suggested an alternative approach to the problem of "procedural
preemption" under the Arbitration Act. Under the New York approach, a state court hearing a
case involving an arbitration agreement to which the federal Act applies may follow state procedural
law only to the extent such law is not outcome-determinative. See Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship
Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 157, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165, 257 N.E.2d 624 (1970); A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels
Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E.2d 774 (1970). See also Note, The Federal
Arbitration Act in State Courts: Converse Erie Problems, 55 CORNELL L. Rav. 623, 625-26 (1970). Cf
Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions - The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIo ST.
L.J. 384, 414 (1970) (in entertaining FELA action state court should concern itself chiefly with
fostering uniformity of result in state and federal court). This converse Erie methodology arguably
would require the state courts to apply, inter alia, the time limitations set out in §§ 10 and 11 of
the federal Act, the separability rule of Prima Paint, and any other procedural rules that might
affect the outcome. Such an approach has only superficial appeal. Erie reaffirmed the fundamental
principle, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), that the federal government is a sovereign of limited
assigned powers, see Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 702-04 (1974), and
the outcome-determinative test implements that principle by preventing the federal court from
infringing on state-created rights. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-69 (1965); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In contrast, in an action in state court where the right
sued upon is federal, the problem is not a mirror image of Erie. See Hill, supra, at 412-15. The
state court's obligation turns on the principle of supremacy of federal law. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947). The extent to which the state court procedures must yield in deference to
the federal right should be a question of preemption, resolved on the basis of the relevant federal
statutory language and goals, and state law should continue to operate unless necessarily displaced
by the federal law at issue.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 861
n.9 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983).
214. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982), quoted supra note 31.
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matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties."12 5 Additionally, section 8 authorizes use of libel and seizure of vessels to commence
an action "[ilf the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable
in admiralty." 2" 6 Although other provisions of the Act, such as sections 9, 10,
and 11, do not contain comparable language, that omission does not mean
Congress wanted to place those provisions on different jurisdictional footing.
Nevertheless, a few courts have interpreted sections 9 and 10 as jurisdictional
grants since those sections do not contain the restrictive language of sections
3, 4, and 8.2'7 Such an interpretation rests on a superficial reading of the statute
and ignores the fact that none of the sections contains language normally found
in jurisdictional grants. 21 8 Moreover, the legislative history belies any intent to
add to the jurisdiction of federal courts.
As originally drafted, the arbitration bill contained a section that would have
modified the amount in controversy requirement for diversity cases brought
under the Act:
Sec. 8 That if the basis of jurisdiction be diversity of citizenship ...
the district court or courts which would have jurisdiction if the matter
in controversy exceeded . . the sum or value of $3000, shall have
jurisdiction to proceed hereunder notwithstanding the amount 21in9 controversy is unascertained or is to be determined by arbitration.
During the 1923 Senate hearing on the bill, the provision was criticized on the
basis that it might add to already crowded federal dockets.225 The House passed
the version containing the provision, but the Senate amended the bill by striking
the provision and the House concurred. 22' By eliminating the proposed section
8, Congress clarified its intention that cases brought under the Act satisfy independent jurisdictional requirements. Since the proposed section 8 was worded
to affect all proceedings under the Act, apparently Congress viewed the Act as
a single unit vis-a-vis jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding Congress's clear intent to require an independent jurisdictional basis, at least two courts have offered the surprising suggestion that certain
proceedings under the Act may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts. In Hilton Construction Co. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 22 2 involving

215. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), quoted supra note 32.
216. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1982).
217. See,e.g., Kallen v. District 1199 Nat'l Union of Hosp. Eng'rs, 574 F.2d 723, 726 n.6
(2d Cir. 1978); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 425-26 (2d Cir.
1974).
218. By contrast, for example, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards expressly provides for federal-question jurisdiction over actions falling under the
Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982) states that an action within the Convention "shall be deemed
to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States
. . . shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount
in controversy."
219. H.R. REP. No. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted at 65 CONe. REC. 11081 (1924).
220. Hearing on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 10 (Senator Sterling reading letter from Mr. Bailey).
221.
See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
222. 166 Ga. App. 40, 303 S.E.2d 119, aff'd, on other grounds 251 Ga. 701, 308 S.E.2d 830
(1983).
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an arbitration within the purview of the Act, one party went into state court
to vacate the award, and the other party counterclaimed for award confirmation.
The trial court confirmed the award, and the court of appeals affirmed on the
ground that section 10 proceedings to vacate were within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. 223 The court thus decided that state courts may confirm
but not vacate arbitration awards. The Georgia Supreme Court left undecided
the question whether state courts have jurisdiction to vacate, reasoning that if
such jurisdiction exists, then federal law provides the standards, 224 and since
the party requesting the order had not met any of the showings required under
2 25
section 10, the award confirmation was proper.
The question of exclusive jurisdiction arose in a different context in General
Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp.22 6 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that

petitions for arbitration award confirmations under section 9 of the Act must
be supported by an independent jurisdictional basis. 227 Nevertheless, the court
adopted a district court's suggestion that if the parties have not specified a
particular court for confirmation in their agreement, federal court is the exclusive forum for confirmation under the terms of section 9.225 Under the Ninth
Circuit's view, if parties to an arbitration agreement have not specified a confirnmation court, and no basis for federal court jurisdiction exists, then no court
229
may exercise jurisdiction over a petition to confirm an award.
The suggestion that state courts lack jurisdiction to 'confirm, modify, or
vacate arbitration awards within the purview of the Act is unfounded. First,
sections 9, 10, and 11 do not purport to give exclusive authority to federal
courts.23 The traditional presumption, moreover, is that Congress intends con-

current rather than exclusive jurisdiction. 23' The presumption seems particularly
appropriate where the statute in question is not an independent grant of jurisdiction. Second, such an approach creates an illogical statutory structure. If
state courts were barred from entertaining certain post-arbitration petitions,
some arbitration awards within the purview of the Act would be absolutely
shielded from judicial challenge or judicial confiru-mation. Finally, the greatest
fallacy in attributing to Congress the intent to create exclusive federal jurisdiction is the assumption that Congress meant to delimit the authority of state
courts at all. Congress relied primarily on its power over federal court procedure
in enacting the Arbitration Act, and apparently gave little thought to the Act's

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

166 Ga. App. at 41-47, 303 S.E.2d at 120-23.
251 Ga. at 702-03, 308 S.E.2d at 831-32.
Id at 832.
655 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
Id/ at 971. Section 9 provides that if no court is specified in the agreement of the parties,

"application [for confirmation of the award] may be made to the United States court in and for
the district within which such award was made." See supra note 35 for the full language of 9.
228. 655 F.2d at 970. The court apparently interpreted i 9's language, "application may be
made to the United States court," to mean application may be made only to a United States court.
229. The illogic of such an interpretation did not escape the court, but the court felt "compelled" to so read the statute. See 655 F.2d at 971.
230. Each statutory provision uses permissive rather than mandatory phrasing. See supra notes
35, 37-38.
231. See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-09 (1962).
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potential applicability in state courts. While the mandate of section 2, to be
consistent with the legislative history, should be construed to apply to state and
federal courts alike, the procedural provisions of the Act regarding post-arbitration judicial involvement apply by their own terms only to the federal courts.
Because there is no indication Congress intended to strip the state courts of
judicial power in the post arbitration stage, the Act should be construed to
leave intact the states' common law powers to judicially confirm, modify, or
232
vacate awards..
B.

Intersystem Conflicts

After Keating's holding that section 2 of the Arbitration Act applies to state
courts, state and federal courts may often have concurrent jurisdiction to consider questions arising under the Act. Where such concurrent jurisdiction exists,
litigants may seek to use one court system against the other. To illustrate,
assume that X and Y, who are citizens of different states, are general contractor
and subcontractor, respectively, on a construction project and that they have
included a written arbitration agreement in their contract. When problems arise
during the course of the project, X refuses to pay Y. Y sues in state court for
breach of contract. X then moves for a stay pending arbitration invoking the
federal Arbitration Act. The state court finds the dispute falls outside the arbitration agreement and denies the stay. Dissatisfied with the state court's ruling,
X then goes to federal court to seek an order compelling arbitration under
section 4 of the Act.
The hypothesized circumstances raise several procedural problems. May the
state court enjoin X from relitigating the question of arbitrability in federal
court? Should the federal court abstain in deference to ongoing state court
proceedings? If the federal court feels free to reach an independent determination
of the question, may it enjoin the state court litigation? The Supreme Court
effectively answered two of the three questions before Keating, and lower courts
have suggested an approach to the third.
In General Atomic Co. v. Felter I and II, 23 3 New Mexico state courts attempted
to enjoin General Atomic Co. (GAC) from prosecuting future federal court
actions purportedly in conflict with a state court decree. In federal court GAC
sought in part to compel arbitration, despite a finding by New Mexico state
courts that GAC had waived the right to compel arbitration.2 3 4 In its original
reversal of the New Mexico state court injunction and in its later grant of leave
to file a petition for writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the

232. Cf Paul Allison, Inc. v. Minikin Storage of Omaha, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 573, 574-75
(D. Neb. 1978) (federal Arbitration Act did not supersede common law enforcement of arbitration
awards).
233. In General Atomic Co. v. Felter (I), 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
reversed the New Mexico state courts' grant of an injunction restraining GAC from prosecuting
future federal court actions. In General Atomic Co. v. Felter (II), 436 U.S. 493 (1978) (per curiam),
the Court granted leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus because of the New Mexico courts'
failure to comply with the mandate from General Atomic L
234. See 434 U.S. 12, at 12-15.
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principle that state courts lack power to enjoin litigants from filing and prosecuting in personam actions in federal courts. 235 The Court explained that the
state court "is without power under the United States Constitution to interfere
with efforts by GAC to obtain arbitration in federal forums on the ground that
GAC is not entitled to arbitration or for any other reason whatsoever. GAC
' 23 6
... has an absolute right to present its claims to federal forums.
Under GeneralAtomic state courts cannot compel compliance with their decrees
by barring access to federal courts, in "spite of the state courts' unquestioned
competence to decide issues of arbitrability under the Act. The collateral estoppel
effect of a state court ruling in such a circumstance is a defense to be asserted
and resolved in federal litigation and is not a basis for a state court injunction.
Indeed, as the quoted passage indicates, the Court views the state court's lack
of power to bar federal court litigation as a function of federal constitutional
structure. Although critics have argued such a view relegates state courts to
second-class status, 237 the Supreme Court has shown no sign of retreat. Moreover neither the history of the Arbitration Act nor the statute on its face suggests
23 8
Congress wanted to alter this traditional view of state authority.
The question of a federal court's authority to stay proceedings in deference
to a parallel state court action came before the Supreme Court in the arbitration
context in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.23 9 Clarifying the import of its earlier decision in Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. United States,24 the Court held that a federal district court abused its discretion
by staying a federal action to compel arbitration pending completion of a lawsuit
in state court between the same parties. 24' The Moses H. Cone facts were similar
to those in the hypothesized illustration. The hospital, engaged in a dispute
over a construction project, filed a lawsuit in state court seeking a declaratory
judgment that Mercury and a co-defendant had no right to arbitration. 242 Before
any ruling on the merits in state court, Mercury filed a federal court action

235. See id. at 17-19; 436 U.S. 493, 497. The Supreme Court gave one of its first clear
pronouncements of the principle in Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
236. 436 U.S. at 439.
237. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter (I), 434 U.S. 12, 19-21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Arnold, State Power to Enjoin Federal Court Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REv. 59 (1965).
238. See 9 U.S.C §S 1-14 (1982). The problem of intersystem conflict was not addressed during
the hearings on the Act. Not long after the passage of the Act, however, a case came before the
Supreme Court involving a related federal-state conflict, and the Court's comments reveal the
prevailing view of state authority. In Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Weschester Serv. Corp.,
293 U.S. 449 (1935), plaintiff brought a federal court action on a contract containing an arbitration
clause. On the basis of the clause, which provided that arbitration could be compelled only in a
New York state court, defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration. The Court held the choice
of forum provision did not affect the federal court's power to stay litigation before it. 293 U.S.
at 453. Significantly, the Court added that if it were to hold otherwise, "it would be impossible
to secure a stay of an action in the federal courts when the arbitration agreement provides for
compulsory proceedings exclusively in the state courts, since only in exceptional circumstances may
a state court enjoin proceedings begun in a federal court." Id.
239. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
240. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
241. See 460 U.S. 1, 27-28.
242. Id. at 6-7.
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section 4 of the Arbitration Act. On the
court stayed Mercury's federal court suit
suit because the two actions involved the
Mercury's claims. 24 1

The Supreme Court held the federal court's stay was inconsistent with the
strong institutional obligation federal courts have to exercise the jurisdiction
assigned to them by Congress. 2 4 The Court cautioned, "[t]he decision whether
to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation does not rest
on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors
as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of
the exercise of jurisdiction.' '24- Under the Court's formulation, the most relevant
factors in the arbitration context include the effect of piecemeal adjudication
on federal policy in the particular case, the order in which the courts obtained
and exercised jurisdiction, the applicable law, and the adequacy of state court
proceedings to protect litigants' federal rights.2 46 The Court found the various
factors to favor retention of jurisdiction in the circumstances before it, giving
particular weight to the uncertainty surrounding the availability in state court
47
of an order compelling arbitration.2
Despite the Court's strong disapproval of the district court's stay in Moses
H. Cone, the outlined approach should support a stay on somewhat different
facts, particularly after Keating. State courts are presumptively competent to
resolve questions under the Act even though the applicable law is federal. If
a state court hears and resolves a question of arbitrability or waiver under the
Act before any proceedings of substance begin in the federal court214 the federal
court will have no reason to enter the fray and second-guess the state court's
decision. Indeed, to the extent the state court determination would be binding
on another court of the same state, the federal court should be comparably

243.

Id. at 7.

244.

Id. at 14-15.

245.

Id. at 16.

246. Id. at 19. Other factors in the Colorado River formulation that typically would be immaterial
in the context of duplicative proceedings pertaining to arbitration disputes are the relative convenience of the two forums and the assumption of jurisdiction by one of the courts over a res.
See id.
247. Id. at 19-28. The Supreme Court suggested that while the stay provision of § 3 of the
Arbitration Act applies to state courts as well as federal courts, doubt exists whether 5 4 applied
to state courts. Id. at 26 nn.34-35. Hence, Mercury might be unable to obtain an order compelling
arbitration if the federal court suit were dismissed. The Court's dictum should not be read to
mean the literal terms of § 3 are binding on the state courts. See supra note 31.
The Court additionally emphasized that federal law under the Arbitration Act would provide
the rule of decision on the merits, and that "the presence of federal-law issues must always be a
major consideration weighing against surrender [of jurisdiction]." 103 S. Ct. at 26.
248. In Moses H. Cone no substantial proceedings in the state court suit had taken place when
the federal suit began. "In realistic terms, the federal suit was running well ahead of the state
suit at the very time that the District Court decided to refuse to adjudicate the case." Id. at 22.
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bound under the 28 U.S.C. § 1738 mandate. 249 Moreover, a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction in such a context potentially would run counter to the
federal statutory policy of "rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration

agreements. "250
In Moses H. Cone the Court noted but did not address the question whether
a federal court might stay a state court suit pending arbitration under the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.251 Such an issue would be posed if a party
under a federal court order compelling arbitration were to continue litigating
the underlying dispute in state court. In this circumstance the federal court
would face the dilemma of either allowing state court litigation to continue in
disregard of the order compelling arbitration, or of ensuring compliance with
the order by issuing an injunction against state court proceedings. The availability of the latter alternative depends, in part, on the operation of the AntiInjunction Act.
Section 2283 prohibits federal court injunctions of pending state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. "252 Several
courts have concluded a federal district court has power to enjoin state court
litigation in conjunction with an order compelling arbitration, reasoning that
an injunction is necessary "to protect or effectuate" the federal decree compelling arbitration. 253 Such a statutory construction assumes that a federal court
order compelling arbitration or staying litigation pending arbitration is a "judgment" within the meaning of section 2283. While the intended meaning of
"judgment" is ambiguous, a reasonable basis exists for concluding that orders
entered under section 3 or section 4 of the Arbitration Act are sometimes but
not always "judgments" within the meaning of section 2283.
The statutory exceptions were added as part of the 1948 revision of the
federal Judicial Code, 254 and the Revisers' Notes make dear the exception "to

249. 28 U.S.C. 5 1738 (1982) provides that "judicial proceedings ... shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken." See Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1183 (11th Cir. 1981) (state
court determination of validity of arbitration agreement should be given full faith and credit in
federal court under 5 1738); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391 (5th
Cir. 1981) (district court erred in not considering preclusive effect of state court's denial of motion
to compel arbitration).
250. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23. If, for example, a state court issued an order compelling
arbitration, and a dissatisfied party then went into federal court to attempt to litigate the same
controversy, the federal court's intervention would go directly against the asserted statutory goal.
251. Id. at 25 n.32.
252. 28 U.S.C. S 2283 (1982). The Act poses no bar to an injunction of a future state court
proceeding. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). Even absent the statutory
bar, however, the propriety of a federal injunction of state court litigation is limited by the doctrine
of equitable restraint. See infia notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 482 F. Supp. 788, 791-92
(D. Fla. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Network Cinema Corp. v.
Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl,
260 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
254. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968.
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protect or effectuate its judgments" was meant to restore federal courts' authority "to enjoin relitigation of cases and controversies fully adjudicated by
such courts." '55 Under the common reading of the statute, the exception authorizes injunctions where necessary to ensure that federal court decrees are
given full res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in state court. 25 6 In light of
the statute's intended operation, courts and commentators have concluded that
the reference to judgments in section 2283 means decrees from which an immediate appeal may be taken. 25 71 Since the requirement of finality in the law
of res judicata largely parallels the law on appealability,2 5 8 the focus on appealability is consistent with the goal of the relitigation exception. Thus, the
relitigation exception's applicability turns on the appealability of the federal
court order in question.
Typically, where a lawsuit includes only arbitrable claims, courts
follow an order compelling arbitration under section 4 with a dismissal of the
action. 25 9 Such an order is final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) 260 and
qualifies as a judgment under section 2283. An order denying a motion to
compel, however, is a non-final interlocutory decision that would not be subject
to ordinary appeal and should not be deemed a judgment under section 2283.
In contrast, grant or denial of a section 3 stay of litigation pending arbitration
is not a "final decision" under section 1291261 but may be appealable as an
interlocutory order granting or refusing an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)." 2

255. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (Reviser's Note). The Note explains that the amendments were meant
to restore the law as it existed before the decision in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118 (1941), where the Supreme Court held the Act barred injunctions of state litigation to
protect federal court judgments.
256. See, e.g., Lee v. Terminal Transp. Co., 282 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1960), cet. denied, 365
U.S. 828 (1961) (injunction issued to ensure res judicata effect of federal judgment); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alumnium Co., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972) (same); Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. Woodman Realty Co., 542 F.2d 45 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977) (injunction issued to ensure collateral estoppel effect
of federal judgment). See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4226, 341-44 (1978).
257. See, e.g., Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chemicals, 695 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th
Cir. 1983) (pretrial order striking certain defenses is not final judgment and therefore does not
trigger relitigation exception of § 2283); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 231, at

346-47.
258. See RESTATEMENT SECOND OF JUDGMENTS 9 13 comment b (1982) (although a grant of
extraordinary interim review under modern procedural practice does not necessarily trigger doctrines
of preclusion, "[a] general working description of finality in the field of former adjudication will,
however, resemble the older, traditional, strict formulation of the concept of finality for appellate
review. ").
259. See, e.g., Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l, 659 F.2d 817, 818 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981).
Cf Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957) (order directing arbitration under 5 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act appealable as final judgment).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeal over "final decisions"
of the district courts. See University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimare, Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th
Cir. 1983) (order to arbitrate was appealable final decision, even where district court retained
jurisdiction to provide further relief if needed).
261. E.g., Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir. 1973).
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982) grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over appeals
from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." Id.
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According to a formalistic doctrine followed by most courts, 26 3 the grant or
denial of a stay pending arbitration is appealable if the action in which the
stay is sought could have been maintained as an action at law before the merger
of law and equity. For exaniple, if an ordinary breach of contract suit were
filed for money damages and the defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration, the court's ruling on the motion for stay would be immediately appealable.

264

Hence, in many circumstances a federal court's determination of a question
of arbitrability will be appealable, thereby constituting a "judgment" within
the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and triggering applicability of the relitigation exception. 265 Nevertheless, availability of an exception under section
2283 does not mean an injunction is appropriate. Although some federal courts
have issued injunctions of state court litigation simultaneously with orders compelling arbitration without requiring any special showing, 266 such an approach
ignores the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief. 267 Moreover, the doctrine

263. The doctrine, known as the Enelow-Ettelson rule, evolved in a series of Supreme Court
cases, set Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 381-83 (1935); Shanferoke Coal &
Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 451-52 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 190-92 (1942); and has been widely followed, see, e.g., Alascom, Inc.
v. ITT North Elec. Co., 727 F.2d 1419, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1984); Microsoftware Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 1982); Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Int'l,
659 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1981), despite pointed criticism from the bench, see, e.g., Hayes
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1336-41 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting); Hussain v.
Bache & Co., 562 F.2d 1287, 1289, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1977); and in commentary, C. WRIHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 710-11 (4th ed. 1983); Mathy, The Appealability of District Court Orders
Staying Court Proceedings Pending Arbitration, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 31, 43-51 (1979).
264. See Alascom, Inc. v. ITT North Elec. Co., 727 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984).
265. Alternatively, one could argue that the Arbitration Act itself is an "expressly authorized"
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. The Arbitration Act does not explicitly authorize issuance of
an injunction against state court litigation, but the Supreme Court has held a federal law need
not refer to S 2283 nor need it expressly authorize an injunction of state court proceedings in order
to qualify under the exception. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1972). Rather, the
test is "whether an Act of Congress, dearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a
federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding." Id. The Arbitration Act, as Keating makes dear, creates a federal right to specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. The right is enforceable through federal injunctive powers
where there is an independent basis of federal court jurisdiction. Moreover, the right to arbitration
enforcement arguably can be given its intended scope only if the federal court has the power to
stay litigation in all forums. The difficulty with such an analysis is that it gives the Arbitration
Act an effect not contemplated by the drafters. The expressed hope during the hearings on the
arbitration bill was that it would spur state legislatures to follow the federal Act as a model, See
Hearing on S. 4214, supra note 25, at 2 (remarks of Charles Bernheimer); Joint Hearings, supra note
25, at 27-28 (remarks of Alexander Rose), and the drafters reassured Congress that the proposed
bill would not force the states into arbitration enforcement by means of the "federal bludgeon."
See Joint Hearings, supra note 25, at 40 (written statement of Julius Cohen).
266. See, e.g., Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Baldwin, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Necchi Sewing
Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
267. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 482 F. Supp. 788, 792 (D. Fla.
1980), reo'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (before issuing injunction court should
inquire as to threat of irreparable harm and inadequacy of remedies at law, and if state court does
not accord federal decree recognition, then equitable relief might be warranted).
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of equitable restraint assumes particular vitality in the context of a federal-state
268
injunction.
Any time a federal court considers whether to grant an injunction restraining
state court litigation, it should presume the state court competent to resolve
federal questions raised in litigation before it. Keating confirmed that state courts
are bound by the Arbitration Act. If a party subject to a federal court order
compelling arbitration attempts to litigate the underlying dispute in state court,
the state court presumably will not tolerate litigation in contravention of the
federal decree. A federal injunction should not issue under such circumstances
unless the federal court finds an inadequacy of legal remedies, that is, the
inadequacy of raising the defense of collateral estoppel in state court. Until a
reason exists to predict that the state court will disregard the terms of the Act
or of a federal court ruling, the federal court should refuse to coerce compliance
26 9
through the injunctive process.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In its decision in Keating, the Burger Court advanced one of its heralded
causes at the expense of another. While the construction of the federal Arbitration Act in Keating should serve the purpose of reducing litigation in state
and federal courts, the holding severely undercuts the states' exercise of their
regulatory powers. The drafters intended the Arbitration Act to be a statute
of limited scope, primarily procedural in nature, designed to ensure availability
of a federal remedy of specific enforcement for certain written arbitration agreements. Through judicial interpretations expanding the impact of the Act, the
Court now reads the Act to preempt all state substantive policies favoring judicial resolution of particular claims. Such undermining of state legislative au-

268. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U S. 225, 243 (1972). Although the abstention doctrine of Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), should not apply to a request for an injunction of a purely private
civil suit in state court, the federalism concerns underlying that doctrine should figure in the federal
court's decision of whether to grant discretionary equitable relief. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970):
Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings
should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion
to finally determine the controversy. The explicit wording of 5 2283 itself implies as much,
and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion.
Id.
269. If the state court in such a circumstance were to make an actual determinaton that it
was not bound by the earlier federal ruling, the question of the preclusive effect of that state court
determination under 5 1738 would be posed. Cf. Trienies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66
(1939) (state court determination on res judicata effect of previous judgment was binding in later
interpleader action). While a federal court under § 1738 generally must give full faith and credit
to state court decrees, arguably the relitigation exception to § 2283 empowers the federal court to
be the final adjudicator as to the ies judicata effect of its prior judgments on a subsequent state
action. As at least one court has recognized, to hold otherwise would mean that a party with a
favorable federal judgment would have to rush back to federal court for a res judicata ruling any
time there was a chance that a state court might rule on the issue first. See First Alabama Bank
v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 747 F.2d 1367, 1376 (1lth Cir. 1984).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss1/4

42

Atwood: Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration A

1985]

FED-STATE RELATIONS UNDER FAA

thority was not a goal of the Sixty-Eighth Congress and runs counter to the
20
Burger Court's solicitude, prominent in other contexts, for state sovereignty.
By ignoring congressional intent, the Court in effect created federal policy out
of whole cloth. This exercise in judicial lawmaking is particularly problematic
21
in Keating since the Court's holding impacts directly on state interests.
Because of the limited objective of the Arbitration Act and traditional restraints on the preemption doctrine, lower courts should read Keating narrowly.
The Act, when applicable, preempts any state law that burdens arbitration
agreements generally or that insulates particular claims from arbitration. Nevertheless, the Act does not supersede state procedural law relating to enforcement
of arbitration agreements as long as state law is consistent with the substantive
command of section 2. Furthermore, the Act leaves intact state law that defines
the rights of parties without regard to arbitration.
Finally, the Keating decision confirms the competency of state courts to decide
questions of federal law. The Sixty-Eighth Congress did not intend to withdraw
state court jurisdiction or to subject state courts to supervision by the federal
judiciary. Thus, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
arbitration agreements, and both court systems are competent to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards. If intersystem conflicts arise on questions of
arbitrability, courts should adhere to established doctrines of judicial restraint.
Federal intervention in state court proceedings should not occur except upon
a showing of extraordinary need.

270. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The irony
might explain the uncharacteristic alignment Of justices in Kating, -with Justices O'Connor and
Rehnquist dissenting from a majority opinion authored by the Chief Justice. See The Supreme Court,
1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1984) (statistical table showing that Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger concurred in 87.5% of the Court's full-opinion decisions, and that Justice
O'Connor and the Chief Justice concurred in 91-2% of the decisions).
271. Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit recognized this problem in Metro Indus.
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386 (2d Cir. 1961) (concurrence) ("Having
no clear mandate from Congress as to the extent to which state statutes and decisions are to be
superseded, we must be cautious in construing the [Arbitration Act] lest we excessively encroach
on the powers which Congressional policy, if not the Constitution, -would reserve to the states.").
See generally Mishkin, supra note 178, at 799-800; Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The

Rol of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.REv. 543
(1954). In theory Congress, if dissatisfied, can alter the Court's interpretation legislatively, and,

conversely, by not acting Congress may indicate tacit approval of the Court's statutory construction.
Because of institutional inertia, however, Congress's silence is a weak foundation for a presumption
of legislative approval. See generally 2A C. SANDS,

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S

49.10

(1973).
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